Sherman Act and Multi-Corporate Single-Traders: Competition Among Affiliates by Editors,
[Vol. 100
NOTES
THE SHERMAN ACT AND MULTI-CORPORATE SINGLE-
TRADERS: COMPETITION AMONG AFFILIATES?
Among the recent developments which have posed the question
whether the antitrust laws require competition among affiliates, the most
striking is Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States.' A truncated
statement of that decision is that American Timken violated the Sherman
Act by entering market allocation and other agreements with its foreign
affiliates and that adequate relief could be achieved by injunction so that
divestiture was not proper.2 On its face, this decision seems to demand
commercial schizophrenia in an enterprise conducted through several cor-
porate entities. Closer analysis of the actual matter before the Court will
confirm the validity of abstracting so broad a proposition from the case for
the paradoxical reason that the generalized language of the Court far
exceeded what the facts required. The case is the first to indicate that
the antitrust laws demand inter-affiliate competition.
Preliminary considerations are needed to orient the inquiry. "Affil-
iates" has no fixed content but in the argot of trade regulation usually
connotes horizontal integration-common ownership or control of corpora-
tions which function on the same economic level.8 Such multi-corporate
organization of an enterprise can have peculiar significance under the Sher-
man Act which as the keystone of the law of economic regulation broadly
interdicts monopolization and restraint of trade.4 The words of the statute
prohibit monopoly and conspiracy and attempts to monopolize but, without
condemning restraint of trade as such, prohibit every contract, combination
or conspiracy to restrain trade. This difference makes multi-corporate
organization immaterial under § 2 which embraces both individual and
joint action 5 but poses the issue under § 1 whether to employ economic or
1. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
2. A related and apparently similar set of facts resulted in a consent decree in
United States v. SKF Industries, Inc., CCH TRADE CASES 62,708 (E.D. Pa.
1950), which enjoined a domestic roller-bearing manufacturer from performing mar-
ket allocation, price-fixing and other agreements with its Swedish parent company
and foreign affiliates.
3. Horizontal integration is used here to designate the state of central control of
plural units with uniform functions, see THORP ET Ai, THE STRucruRE OF INDUSTRY
146, 597 (TNEC Monograph 27, 1940), as distinquished from the process of con-
solidating those units, as the term is used in Hale, Diversification: Impact of
Monopoly Power Upon Multi-Product Firms, 98 U. OF PA. L. REv. 320, 321 (1950).
For the use of the term "affiliates" in discussions of general corporation law, see
LATTY, SUaSIDIAIES AND AFrrIATED CORPORATIONS (1936). Probably the only
instance in which the term has legal significance is in taxation. See INT. REv. CODE
§ 113(a) (11), § 141.
4. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1946).
5. Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44 ILT. L. REv. 743, 748 (1950)
points out that for most practical purposes both sections are conspiracy sections.
For a case in which the difference had some significance, see United States v.
Lorain Journal Co., 92 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ohio 1950), aff'd. 342 U.S. 143 (1951),
discussed infra at text after note 19.
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legal units as the basis of computation in determining whether there has
been the required collaboration. "Economic unit" is a necessarily nebulous
expression but does convey an idea that is workable with relation to specific
examples.6 The core of the thought is centralized management or control
representing one business despite corporate structures-a familiar phe-
nomenon in our present economy.7 The question of interaffiliate competi-
tion is primarily then a matter of whether substantial economic unity is
to be treated as unity in legal purview in the application of § 1.8
In analyzing the question, several issues are involved. The initial
problem is whether collaboration of affiliates is a conspiracy within the
meaning of the Act. If it is, determination must be made whether the
object of the conspiracy constitutes a restraint of trade under the "rule of
reason." An affirmative answer here presents the subsidiary point whether
a restraint otherwise unreasonable per se might be justified by the fact
affiliates are involved. What special effect, if any, results from the fact
defendant in an antitrust action is engaged in foreign commerce is a sepa-
rate question but must be considered here because of its bearing on the
Timken decision. Finally, on the supposition that inter-affiliate collabora-
tion may violate the Act, the most significant question of all arises as to
the relief necessary.
THE PARTIES TO A CONSPIRACY IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE
The words contract, combination and conspiracy in § 1 of the Sherman
Act have rarely been the subject of close analysis or nice distinctions in
the courts. 9 The meaning of contracts in restraint of trade could readily
6. A variety of phrases have been evoked in an effort to define the thought:"single trader," "joint venture, .... joint enterprise," "single enterprise," "enterprise
entity," "community of interest."
7. Crowder, The Integration of Manufacturing Operations in THE STauc-rMt
OF IxiusRmY, supra note 3, presents a statistical study of the structural aspects of
plural-unit businesses under central-office management. The various types of control
possible among enterprises are outlined. Id. at 105. The TNEC study does not indi-
cate corporate structures but on the basis of central-office groups reveals the high
degree of horizontal integration. Id. at 146, 151 et seq., 597. The phenomenon has
even increased since that time. Of all mergers between 1940 and 1948, 62% were
of the horizontal type. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly
Power of the Committee of the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 14, Part 1,
217 (1949); see Hale, Size and Shape: The Individual Enterprise As A Monopoly,
1950 U. oF ILL. LAW FoR m 515, 519 (1950).
The FTC recently reported that "the 1,000 largest manufacturing corporations
which publish financial statements" are connected with 7,557 "subsidiary and affiliate
companies." FTC Release of September 13, 1951.
8. The theory has been advanced that in matters of general corporation law
courts deal with the "enterprise entity" bounded by economics rather than with the
legal forms. Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 Cor. L. REv. 343 (1947).
9. United States v. Addystone Pipe and Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898)
is typical. At 291, it is said the defendants entered a combination and at 293,
". .. this contract of association brings it within the term used in the statute, a con-
spiracy in restraint of trade." In the Supreme Court opinion in the case it was said
the ". . . case . . . involves contracts as the result of combination." Addystone
Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 240 (1899). In United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), Judge Caffey said:
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be found in the common law ancestry of the statute. Attempted distinc-
tion between combination and conspiracy requires more effort and perhaps
amounts to mere word play. Factual patterns of decided cases do provide
some basis of classification. In merger cases, unification of former com-
petitors is the gist of the offense. Typically these cases involve permanent
changes in property interests and receive a more indulgent judicial treat-
ment than less permanent forms of joinder such as price agreements among
competitors.10 The latter are more suggestive of conspiracy than of com-
bination. The line of demarcation is thin and wavering; yet it indicates
the traditional distinction between loose-knit and close-knit association."
A mixture of the two is found in the present subject-matter. Close prop-
erty interests exist but concert of action not involving property changes
is the main concern. Whether such concert be termed contract, combina-
tion or conspiracy is of no consequence for the purpose of determining the
application of § 1. For brevity, and in keeping with the language most
frequently used in the courts, the matter can be examined in the context
of the conspiracy doctrine under the Act.
The classic concept of conspiracy has little relevance to the modern
conspiracy in restraint of trade. At the outset, this was destined to be a
special type by the very words of the Sherman Act. Restraint of trade
was not illegal at common law and was not made a substantive offense under
the Act; although it was not a crime to do it, it became one to agree to do it.
Even if this kind of conspiracy was within the classic doctrine to an extent,
it inevitably took on its own "special coloration". 12 Precedents in exam-
ining such conspiracy should therefore be properly gathered only within
the confines of the area of trade regulation.
One vestige of the root concept of conspiracy is that a conspiracy in
restraint of trade still connotes an idea of multiplicity of parties, a minimum
of duality. Who or what is to be considered an integral for the purpose of
counting the necessary parties has posed a recurring problem.' 8 Collusion
among independent individuals or corporations usually provides a clear-cut
case.14 The problem is sharply presented where the conspiracy alleged is
between affiliated corporations or between a corporation and its owners,
directors or officers. These situations are intertwined in an economic sense
in that a single enterprise is involved in each and in a legal sense in that
"While the Act speaks of contract, combination and conspiracy, for convenience I
shall include all of them under the vord conspiracy." Id. at 224. See Rahl, supra
note 5, at 744 n. 5.
10. Handler, Industrial Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws, 32 CoL. L. REv. 179
(1932) ; Zlinkoff & Barnard, Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws, 97 U. OF PA. L.
Rv. 151 (1948).
11. Weston, The Application of the Sherman Act to "Integrated" and "Loose"
Industrial Combinations, 7 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 42 (1940).
12. Justice Jackson concurring in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445
(1949). This opinion is a provocative discussion of the general law of conspiracy.
13. For a simplified but incisive discusson of the problem, see LOEVINGER, THE
LAW OF FREE ENTERPRISE 55-87 (1949).
14. But cf. Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
any distinction between them might be no more than an empty formalism
because of their close similarity.
Intra-corporate conspiracy.-Authority on the question whether a con-
spiracy might be found solely between a corporation and its officers or
agents is sparse and somewhat muddled. As a matter of theorizing, the
proposition is intriguing since a corporation can act only through its agents.
If a single natural individual has acted, the view that he is one party to a
conspiracy and the entity for which he acts the other, is an uneasy jumbling
of fact and fiction and has been rejected by a few clear holdings.' 5 The
joinder of several natural persons acting for the corporation may be inter-
preted as a conspiracy of the corporation on alternative bases: the agree-
ment of the individuals might be treated as the illegal act which is imputed
to the corporation 16 or each individual may be considered as dealing with
the corporation in joining the others so that the corporation becomes a
participant in the conspiracy. Flimsy support for such a holding might be
gleaned from decided federal cases.17 A firmer position to the contrary
has been taken in a number of civil actions for treble damages by private
parties but was usually unnecessary and without compelling rationaliza-
tion.' s Its effect may be minimized by a frank recognition of the judicial
antipathy to treble-damage plaintiffs which one can often sense in reading
the reports.
The only direct attention to the point in the Supreme Court is the
statement in the dissent of Justice Jackson in the Timken case that a cor-
15. Union Pacific Coal Co. v. United States, 173 Fed. 737 (8th Cir. 1909);
Windsor Theatre Co. v. Walbrook Amusement Co., 94 F. Supp. 388 (D.C. Md.
1950), aff'd 189 F.2d 797 (4th Cir. 1951); Neumann v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 70
F. Supp. 447 (N.D. Ill. 1943); Atlanta Brick Co. v. O'Neal, 44 F. Supp. 39 (E.D.
Tex. 1942).
16. Joint indictment of a corporation and its agents participating in a Sherman
Act offense is permissible and may even be necessary. United States v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Co., 149 Fed. 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1906). See § 14 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat.
730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1946). In Tribolet v. United States, 95 Ariz. 85 (1908),
a verdict of guilty was returned against an individual defendant although the cor-
poration for which he acted was acquitted. The Court allowed the verdict. In United
States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941) the verdict was guilty
as to the corporations but not guilty as to their agents. The Court held the verdict
was not inconsistent. See TimE, Nov. 27, 1939, p. 69, for a popular interpretation.
17. United States v. Bausch & Lomb, 321 U.S. 707, 723 (1942) (". . . Soft-
Lite and its officers combined and conspired among themselves . . .") ; White Bear
Theatre Corp. v. State Theatre Corp., 120 F.2d 600 (8th cir. 1942); (Patterson
v. United States, 222_ Fed. 599 (6th Cir. 1915); Bascom Launder Corp. v. Farnay,
10 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); United States v. Keystone Watch Case Co., 218
Fed. 502 (E.D. Pa. 1915) (implied). Contra: United States v. American Naval
Stores Co., 172 Fed. 455 (S.D. Ga. 1909) (charge to jury). A review of the au-
thorities available and an argument for this position is found in Kramer, Concerted
Actions Between a Corporation and Its Officers-A Violation of the Sherman Act?,
11 Fmn. B.J. 130 (1951).
18. Fleetway Inc. v. Public Service Interstate Transpt. Co., 4 F. Supp. 482
(D.C.N.J. 1933), aff'd 72 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1934); Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix
Cheese Corp., 26 F. Supp. 824 (D.C. Md. 1938). Implied in Windsor Theatre
Co. v. Walbrook Amusement Co., 94 F. Supp. 388 (D.C. Md. 1950); Neumann
v. Bastion-Blessing Co., 70 F. Supp. 447 (N.D. Ill. 1943).
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poration cannot conspire with itself. 19 The fact that this was a reiteration
of an assumption of government counsel in argument is especially inter-
esting since the government recently made a strong argument to the con-
trary in the Lorain Journal case. The lower court there expressly re-
frained from ruling on the question since it found the defendant guilty of
an attempt to monopolize; 20 the Supreme Court affirmed on this basis
giving no notice to the question.
21
Hence, in point of law the question is an open one and with the flexible
treatment of conspiracy under the Sherman Act might reasonably be
decided either way. Determination whether a conspiracy may be found
within a single corporation appropriately should hinge on the relation of
the question to the economic purposes of the Act.
22
Inter-corporate conspiracy.-The technical requirements of plural par-
ties for a conspiracy are satisfied with more facility as against two or more
corporations. In the event a single natural individual is involved, the
needed duality might be abstracted from his several representative
capacities. The two courts that have faced the question insisted, however,
that two or more natural persons are essential for a conspiracy.23 Apart
from that rare circumstance, the significant problem has arisen whether a
conspiracy might be charged to affiliated or parent-subsidiary corporations.
In the leading case of United States v. General Motors Corp.,2 4 the
court held that a conspiracy could be found among a parent company and
its three wholly-owned subsidiaries, despite the fact that economcally they
constituted a "single-trader." 25 Subsequent Supreme Court cases em-
ployed the doctrine-2 6 without regard to the compactness of control of the
related corporations 27 and recently some defendants have not even ad-
vanced the single-trader argument.
2 8
19. 341 U.S. 593, 606-607 (1951).
20. United States v. Lorain Journal Co., 92 F. Supp. 794 (N.D Ohio 1950).
21. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 143 (1951).
22. EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 180 (1949); Kramer, supra note 17.
23. Windsor Theatre Co. v. Walbrook Amusement Co., 94 F. Supp. 388 (D.C.
Md. 1950), aff'd, 189 F.2d 797 (4th Cir. 1951) ; United States v. Santa Rita Store
Co., 16 N. M. 3, 113 Pac. 620 (1911). Compare United States v. Yellow Cab, 332
U.S. 218 (1947) and cases in note 15 supra.
24. 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
25. There was early uncertainty on the point in Alexander Milburn Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 15 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 757
(1927). The case seems to say that in the vertical integration involved there was
a combination and "individual competition." Id. at 683.
26. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 304 U.S. 211 (1950);
Schine Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948); United States v. Griffith,
334 U.S. 100 (1948); United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173
(1944).
27. In United States v. Yellow Cab, 332 U.S. 218 (1947), one individual had
effective control of all the corporations involved.
28. E.g., United States v. New York Great A. & P. Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626
(E.D. Ill. 1946), aff'd, 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949). Cf. United States v. Richfield
Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280, 289 (S.D. Cal. 1951) where defendant argued it was
dealing with itself as to exclusive supply contracts since its distributors were in
reality employees; the court rejected the argument.
1010
But even this strong authority did not necessarily compel the finding
of a conspiracy in the Timken case. In all the prior cases the object of the
intercorporate conspiracy was to affect the trade of parties outside the
enterprise. In Timken, however, the principal aims of the collaboration
related to control of the conduct of the affiliates themselves.29 The case
then does establish that a conspiracy may be found among affiliates 'where
its object is the internal activity of the enterprise as well as where it is
coercion of outsiders.
The inter-corporate conspiracy doctrine is therefore well-settled while
the intra-corporate doctrine is still doubtful for the lack of clear precedent.
Because of the logical and factual relation between them perhaps con-
sistency would demand they coincide, so that a conspiracy might be found
as readily within a single corporation as it is among affiliated corporations. 30
For most purposes from the public viewpoint,31 it is immaterial whether
individuals act for a single corporation or for affiliated corporations since
in both instances they are part of a single business,3 2 although that busi-
ness will in probability be larger in the latter situation.33 And at least
in theory, a multi-corporate enterprise could dissolve its several corporate
forms and unite the business in one corporation.34  A practical approach
then might consider these two doctrines as merely aspects of the same prob-
lem and fusing them into one category lend the strong authority of one
to the weak support of the other. In all events the significance is clear:
there is usually little difficulty in finding the technical parties to a con-
spiracy except when a single natural person is involved.3 5 Legal units do
29. This argument was made in the Kiefer-Stewart case, see Note, The Supreme
Court, 1950 Term, 65 HARV. L. REv. 107, 122-123, 1951 which approved of the dis-
tinction but says it was of doubtful application to that case.
30. Rahl, supra note 5; Note, 47 Col L. Rlv. 786 (1947); Note, 43 IIil L.
Rzv. 551 (1948). Implicit here, however, is the problem of reconciling the doctrine
that a single business can select its own customers, etc., United States v. Colgate
Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); cf. FTC v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
31. Within a single enterprise of large size, there may be active "competition"
among the component units but it may be discounted in this discussion since any
benefits derived therefrom redound to the enterprise and not to the public. EDWARDs,
MAINTAINING CoMPEInON 117 (1949).
32. The story is told of the A. & P. employee whose reaction to the government
prosecution of the concern on the basis of conspiracy among the affiliated corpora-
tions was summed up in: "It's all A. & P. to me." Adelman, Effective Competition
and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1289 (1947).
33. The FTC release, supra note 7, indicates that the greatest percentage of
affiliates and subsidiaries are held by the largest corporations.
34. Rahl, supra note 5, at 765; Note, 43 I.L. L. Rav. 551, 553 (1948). But see
text infr after notes 93, 100.
35. For purposes of public enforcement of the antitrust laws, the doctrine did not
have too much significance before the Timken case. In the Crescent, Schine and
Griffith cases, supra note 26, findings of other conspiracies and monopolization
would have sustained the charges. The Yellow Cab case, mspra note 27, seems to
have been treated as a merger case, RahI, supra note 5, at 764 n. 69. In the General
Motors case, the holding that a conspiracy existed among the affiliates was essential
to sustain the indictment. But inhibition of the coercive practice there could have
been accomplished under the Federal Trade Commission Act. A criterion of unfair
competition is what has been declared a restraint of trade under the Sherman Act
and the FTC can proceed against a single business Without reference to an agree-
ment of any kind. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948) ; Handler, Unfair
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not coincide with economic units and the single-trader may conspire with
itself.3 0
The significance of the inter-corporate conspiracy doctrine with respect
to multi-corporate enterprises is that whatever collusion is required for a
Sherman Act violation is easily found within such economic families. Yet
concert of action would seem normal in the multi-form structure of a single-
trader operating through affiliated corporations. A study of the legal basis
on which such normal activity may be branded joint conduct within the
language of the Act leads naturally to an examination of the objects or
results of such conduct that fall within its condemnation.
INTER-AFFILIATE RESTRAINT OF TRADE: THE TImKEN DOCTRINE
In a broad sense, restraint of trade is the antithesis of competition.3 7
Historically the term has been applied to three general categories of cases:
(1) covenants not to compete ancillary to a main transaction such as a
contract of sale or agreement of partnership; (2) mutual agreements of
businessmen to control or suppress competition among themselves; (3)
agreements to restrict the trade of third parties. 38 The latter two classes
of cases have been the significant ones for public trade regulation under
the Sherman Act and may be differentiated by the terms "internal" and
"external" restraints. Of course an external restraint presupposes a regula-
tion of the internal conduct of the collaborators to achieve that end but it
is the principal aim of the agreement. Internal restraint on the other hand
is both the means and the end of the agreement. This distinction is readily
demonstrable. A boycott is an external restraint of trade but requires
Competition and the Federal Trade Commission, 8 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 399, 416
(1940); Montague, The Commission's Jurisdiction Over Practices in Restraint of
Trade, Id. at 365. FTC v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) held unlawful
on the part of a single company practices designed to effect resale price maintenance
which had been declared unlawful by way of contract in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John B. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
Hence, the intercorporate conspiracy doctrine of the Sherman Act in a sense
duplicates the FTC Act to the extent there is a concurrence of remedies under the
two Acts. The treble-damage actions available to private litigants under the Sherman
Act are not provided by the FTC Act but do have some counterparts in the general
law of tort and unfair competition. The criminal penalties of fines and imprisonment
under § 7 of the Sherman Act are not duplicated. The remedy of forfeiture of
property under § 6 of the Sherman Act has been invoked only twice in its whole
history, HAMILTON & TILL, ANTITRUST IN AcIoN (TNEC Monograph 16, 1940).
Divestiture is an important remedy in anti-trust suits. See Oppenheim, Introduction
to Symposium on Divestiture, 19 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 1 (1951) and articles follow-
ing. The FTC has power to order divestment in merger situations under the Celler
Act amendment of § 7 of the Clayton Act, 64 Stat., 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (1951). But
it is limited to cease and desist orders against unfair methods of competition. F.T.C.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927). Where the latter amount to violations
of the Sherman Act there is a parallel remedy in a suit for injunction under § 4 of
that Act.
36. The doctrine has evoked strong comment. Rahi, supra note 5, at 766;
Adelman, supra note 32, at 1312. It also has been christened with some untoward
descriptions such as "corporate self-abuse," Adelman, Integration and Antitrust
Policy, 63 HARv. L. REv. 27, 50 (1949), and "bath tub conspiracy," Searls, The
Antitrust Laws From the Viewpoint of a Private Practictioner in 1950 INSTITUIM
ON ANTITRUST LAWS AND PRICE REGULATIONS 71, 86 (1950).
internal restrictions on the trade of the parties for its success. An internal
restraint such as price-fixing is achieved solely by action in accordance
with the agreement.
As pointed out above, the inter-corporate conspiracy doctrine de-
veloped with respect to external restraints. Before Timken, the cases
established that affiliates violate the Sherman Act by agreements to restrict
the trade of third parties. But Tirmken stands for the proposition that there
is also a violation in an agreement of affiliates to regulate their own conduct.
Since conspiracy is but a technical requirement of the Act,8 9 the treatment
of affiliates as units for the purpose of finding plural parties is not of final
consequence. The significant question is whether affiliates are likewise to
be viewed as units for the purpose of determining what is an unlawful
restraint of trade, the substance of a § 1 violation.4° Conduct which
amounts to illegal restraint of trade among competitors such as price-
fixing,41 production quotas,42 division of territories, 43 uniform conditions of
sale 4 is normal on the part of affiliates under centralized control. Indeed,
a single enterprise operating through several corporations might incite the
censure of its shareholders and creditors if it did not so coordinate its
activities since such matters are appropriate and necessary for intelligent
management of any business. 45 Antitrust law has taken a far-reaching step
37. EDWAIDS, MAINTAINING COMPETiITON 9-10 (1940) outlines the character-
istics of "imperfect competition"; any impairment of these may be broadly classified
as a restraint of trade. Cf. "The court below argued as if maintaining competition
were the expressed object of the act. The Act says nothing about competition. I
stick to the exact words used." Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting in Northern Securities
Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904).
38. LYoN, WATKINS & ABRAmSON, 1 GOVERNMENT & EcoNo,-Ic LIFE 261 (1939)
states that the common law doctrine included the second class and was soon ex-
tended under the statute to embrace the third class of cases. The statement seems
to be supported by the United States v. Addystone Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271,
290 (6th Cir. 1898). Compare Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting in Northern Securities
Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) on the view that the Act prohibited
only the third class of cases and not the second class. Id. at 404, 410.
39. United States v. General Motors, 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941) ; Kramer,
supra note 17. Nonetheless, proof of only the fact of the agreement whether or not
there is an overt act or even power to accomplish it establishes a violation, United
States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
40. Analytic distinction between the conspiracy and the restraint of trade can
fairly be made. See, e.g., Rahl, supra note 5, at 766. Yet the language and history
of the Sherman Act has engendered thinking that restraint of trade, as a conceptual
matter, requires the same duality needed for conspiracy. E.g., "It very definitely
takep two (or more) to make the offense of restraint of trade. It might be said that
restraint of trade is a kind of business bigamy . . ." LoEVIGER, op. cit. smpra
note 13, at 77.
41. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
42. See Id. at 220; Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America,
268 U.S. 295, 310 (1925).
43. United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd,
332 U.S. 319 (1947).
44. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
45. There is also the possibility of violating the Robinson-Patman Act. See U. S.
Rubber Co. et al., FTC Docket 3685, 1 CCH TRADE REG. SERv. ff 2212.210 (re-
spondent tire and rubber company, acting through subsidiaries and other corpora-
tions owned or controlled by it, ordered to discontinue price discrimination between
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if the rigid adherence to legal forms reflected in the inter-corporate con-
spiracy doctrine has reshaped the concept of restraint of trade so that un-
lawful activity may be found in the ordinary management of a single enter-
prise. At present, one case supports the proposition.
The Timken Case.-The history of the relationship of American
Timken and the foreign companies was of basic importance in the case. 46
In 1909, the American firm entered agreements with the predecessor of
the English company in connection with patent licenses, the main purport
of which was to divide territories for the production, sale and replacement
of tapered roller bearings. These agreements were at times modified and
renewed even after the expiration of the basic patents. In 1927, Dewar, the
chairman of English Timken, entered an arrangement to buy that company
in connection with American Timken on the condition that the prior agree-
ments would be continued. The transaction gave Timken and Dewar each
about 50% interest in the English company but left Dewar in control of its
management. The following year the parties organized French Timken
and divided its stock; Dewar was likewise given supervision of that com-
pany. French and English Timken entered an agreement similar to the
American-English scheme.
Against this background, the three companies executed a tripartite
agreement in 1938 to last until 1965, with a supplemental agreement be-
tween Dewar and American and English Timken.47 In substance, the
agreements provided for exclusive territories, price-fixing on replacement
parts and on sales in Russia, use of the trade-mark "Timken" by the
English and French companies and protection and reservation of the rights
to that mark for the American concern. It was on the basis of these
agreements that the government brought an equity action against American
Timken for violation of § 1 and § 3 48 of the Sherman Act.
The government alleged violations not only in the conduct of the com-
panies among themselves but also in their activities with and against SKF,
their international competitor.49  In 1932, English and French Timken
entered a short-lived cartel agreement with SKF which American Timken
did not execute but "prompted and approved". On the other hand, ar-
rangements were made at various times between 1929 and 1940 for sales
in the Canadian market by English rather than American Timken since the
English advantage as to import duties would make it more effective against
SKF in that market. American also agreed to regulate the sale of alloy
steel manufactured by it which was specially adaptable for fabrication of
different classes of dealers). It is interesting to note that, on the other hand, the
FTC will not permit multiple unit enterprises to be treated as single customers for
the purpose of determining allowable costs discounts. Id. 1 2212.530 (orders col-
lected).
46. The statement of facts is taken from the District Court opinion, 83 F. Supp.
284 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
47. Significantly, these agreements contained a lengthy recital of the prior agree-
ments (much, no doubt, to the government prosecutor's delight).
48. Which makes § 1 applicable to the District of Columbia and territories.
49. See note 2 supra.
bearings so that it would not be used in the manufacture of bearings com-
peting with the Timken brand.
There had been some change in the ownership of the Timken com-
panies before and during the course of the case. In 1935, sale of English
Timken stock to the public left Dewar with 25%o of the shares and Amer-
ican Timken with about 30%o so that together they retained control.
Dewar's death during the pendency of the appeal to the Supreme Court
gave American Timken first rights to purchase his shares in both English
and French Timken.50 Hence at the time of the Supreme Court decision,
American Timken could by exercise of the rights become the sole owner
of French Timken and the majority shareholder in English Timken.5'
On these facts the case seems clearly to present a violation of the
Sherman Act. The theory on which the charge is rested, however, is of
paramount importance. The beguiling ambiguity of the relationship of
the Timken companies from the viewpoint of doctrinal characterization
invited judicial confusion and inconsistency. It is not surprising that there
was a three-way split among seven Justices of the Supreme Court; what
does give pause is the broad ground on which the opinion of the Court was
placed.
A variety of interpretations was possible. The theory of the trial
judge adhered closely to the total factual situation. In his view, the Tim-
ken triumvirate was composed of independent companies. He pointed out
that the mutual restrictions on their activities did not evolve from the close
property connections but that the opposite was true. The compelling fact
was that the companies had long evinced a purpose to restrain trade.
52
American Timken's investment in the foreign companies was the outgrowth
of that purpose. 3 Justification of that view lay in the facts that after the
1928 transaction American Timken left the management of the foreign
business to Dewar and that, significantly, the companies considered them-
selves independents and "jealously guarded" their respective interests.
5 4
Apparently, the court would have taken a different view had American
Timken purchased the foreign companies outright or built its own plants
abroad.55 In sum, the companies were independents who had long con-
spired to restrain trade; the sole fact of investment in one by the other
did not justify the offense! 6
50. 341 U.S. 593, 601 n.10.
51. Discussions of the case may be found in Adams, Dissolution, Divorcement
& Divestiture: The Pyrrhic Victories of Antitrust, 27 IND. LJ. 1 (1951); Note,
The Supreme Court, 1950 Term, 65 HARv. L. REv. 107, 113, 123-124 (1951) ; Com-
ment, 25 TEmp. L.Q. 227 (1951).
52. 83 F. Supp. 284, 310 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
53. Id. at 306, 311; cf. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 343,
365 (1947).
54. 83 F. Supp. 284, 311 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
55. Id. at 306, 312. See United States v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 92 F.
Supp. 947, 963 (D. Mass. 1950).
56. The theory doesn't falter because of the creation of French Timken since
in effect competitors were creating a joint production and sales agency., Compare
United States v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., s-apra note 55; United States v. Im-
perial Chemical Industries Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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This approach may not have been taken consistently in the lower court
opinion. The judge apparently held that American Timken was responsible
under the Act for the cartel agreement between the foreign companies and
SKF on the ground it knew and approved of the agreement although it
was not a party to it. 7 So to charge the American company implies that
it was identified with the foreign concerns in one enterprise. 58 If that were
true, it is difficult to comprehend why it was likewise a restraint of trade
for English and American Timken to vie for business together in the
Canadian market against SKF. Perhaps closer analysis would reconcile
this seeming inconsistency. The opinion is somewhat elliptical in this
respect but does convey the dominant thought in the judge's mind that
there was a purpose to restrain trade.59 Though the matter is of minor
importance in the case it illustrates the analytic traps into which a court
can fall in dealing with "integrated competitors."
A second view of the case found expression in one of the defendant's
numerous arguments. American Timken suggested that it had merely
engaged in a "joint venture" with Dewar to which the agreements were
reasonably ancillary. In this view, the companies would still be independ-
ents for the purpose of finding a conspiracy but the restrictions would be
brought within a traditional category of permissible restraints. 60 The
court rejected the contention on alternative grounds. In the first place,
it denied there was a true partnership or joint venture. Even on the
assumption there were, it said that a joint venture formed for the purpose
of continuing illegal restraints could not enjoy the legal sanction accorded
one formed for a lawful purpose.61 The Supreme Court went considerably
further in saying that no restrictive agreement among legally separate
persons could be justified as a joint venture. A clue to the broad sweep
of its thinking is in the statement: "Perhaps every agreement to restrain
trade could be so labeled." 62
A third view of the matter is that which can be attributed to the
Supreme Court. The companies are legally separate persons. The re-
straints are plainly unreasonable per se. Therefore, there is a violation of
the Act. This statement of the approach is hardly more abrupt than the
two sentences the opinion of the Court devoted to it.as Yet the evidence is
ample that they were not a mere abbreviation of the Court's view but a
precise and intentional statement of the broad base on which it made its
57. 83 F. Supp. 384, 304, 307 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
58. In the Aluminum case there was identity of stock control of Alcoa and
Aluminum Limited which participated in a cartel. On the special statutory appeal in
the Second Circuit, it was held that Limited's participation was not attributable to
Alcoa on account of their close connection. United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416, 439-442 (2d Cir. 1945). See EDWARDS, et al., A CARTEL
POLICY FOR THE UNITED NATlONS, 96 (1945).
59. 83 F. Supp. 284, 306 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
60. United States v. Addystone Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
61. 83 Fed. Supp. 284, 312 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
62. 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951).
63. Ibid.
finding of illegality. Examination of the matters on which the Court
divided is adequate illustration.
Justices Black, Douglas and Minton were of the opinion that the Act
was violated, that circumstances of foreign trade were no justification and
that divestiture was properly ordered by the lower court. justice Reed, in
a concurring opinion joined by the Chief Justice, disagreed only as to the
propriety of the divestiture order. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, in
separate dissents, expressed the opinion that the restraints were reasonable
in view of world trade conditions. Hence the Court was divided 5-2 on
the issue of illegality but 4-3 against divestiture as a proper remedy. The
critical points of difference-the operative effect of the foreign trade factor
and the remedial appropriateness of divestiture-deserve examination not
only as illustration of the broad ground of the majority's holding as to
illegality but also as considerations that could have been made relevant to
that question.
Foreign Trade and Tirnken.-The Supreme Court's treatment of the
foreign trade factor is one of the most intriguing parts of this curious case.
Whether conditions of world trade should justify exemptions from the
commands of the Sherman Act is an important and independent question. 4
Its significance here is not only in the way the members of the Court
reacted to it but also in the fact it was even raised in such a context. The
views of Justices Frankfurter and Jackson have an ironic aspect to this case.
The peculiar circumstances of international trade were undoubtedly an
important factor in the government's suit but as reasong that would ag-
gravate rather than justify the restrictive practices of the Timken com-
panies. In particular, the provisions as to trade-mark rights were typical
of a subtle and efficient device of international cartels.
The antitrust division has for sometime been aware of the adaptability
of trade-marks as instruments to facilitate restraints of trade.65 Agree-
ments to divide world markets can be especially fortified by use of a common
trade-mark by the collaborators with the use in a particular country re-
stricted to just one of them. Enforcement of the trade-mark by means of
customs barriers or infringement actions gives the owner of the mark legal
means to prevent breach of the territorial agreement.. The commercial
impracticality, and often impossibility, of doing business under a mark
other than the one in which good-will has been developed adds to the
potency of this weapon. Hence, a concern which has once entered a ter-
64. The majority holding that they do not seems the sounder view. The very
fact that the Webb-Pomerene Act, 40 Stat. 516 (1918), 15 U.S.C. § 61 (1946) was
necessary to legalize combinations in the export trade indicates that such exemption
should come from Congress and not the Courts. Repeal of that Act itself has been
urged. MuND, GOVERNMENT AND BusiNEss 226-230 (1950); Note, 99 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 1195 (1951).
65. This was given official recognition in the division's statement of objections
to the Lanham Trade-Mark Act. Hearings before Senate Committee on Patents on
H.R. 82, 78th Congr., 2d Sess. 68 (1944). An expanded version may be found in
Timberg, Trade-Marks, Monwpoly and the Restraint of Competition, 14 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 323 (1949).
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ritorial arrangement buttressed with such trade-mark provisions cannot
readily abandon it. Nor are the effects limited to the parties to the agree-
ment. Distributors and exporters of the trade-marked product are also
forestalled from invading the geographical divisions by the legal protec-
tion given to the mark. Hence, such trade-mark practices operate as an
impairment of the export and import trade which is severe and difficult to
repair,6 especially when some of the parties are beyond the reach of our
courts.
The fact that such an economic evil was at the heart of the Timken
situation 67 could have been given varying emphasis. It demonstrates that
horizontal integration on the international level is significantly distin-
guishable from the same phenomenon solely within the domestic economy
so that a holding of unreasonable restraint in the former situation would
not necessarily govern in the latter. At the minimum, it should have meant
that if the factor of foreign commerce were to be made operative, it should
have been antagonistic rather than favorable to the defendant. But these
trade-mark considerations received no explicit attention in the opinions of
the Justices. On the contrary, the defendant, argued that the territorial
restrictions could be justified as reasonably ancillary to the licensing of the
trade-mark. That claim met with no success.68 But the further argument
that peculiarities of world trade should be taken into account persuaded
two Justices to dissent and largely contributed to swaying two other Jus-
tices to vote for reversal of the divestiture order. Thus occurred a situation
in which a factor that was a major ingredient of the government's theory
in bringing suit had the obverse effect of causing denial of complete relief-
an interesting insight into the administration of the antitrust laws.
This departure of the Justices from the precise facts of the case was
but the first step in that direction. The majority who determined to give
weight to the plea of difficulties of world trade made some striking state-
ments in connection with it. Justice Reed said that "The difficulties of
cultivating a foreign market for our manufactured goods obviously entered
into creation of the British and French companies so as to enjoy a right
of distribution where otherwise restrictions . . . might be expected." 69
Justice Frankfurter spoke of arrangements that afford "opportunities for
exportation from this country and importation into it." 70 Justice Jackson
apparently saw the question to be decided as whether "it should be regarded
66. The decree in the Tinken case cancelled the reversionary right of the Ameri-
can company in the mark. Timberg, Equitable Relief Under the Sherman Act,
1950 U. OF IiL. LAW FoRum 629, 653-654 (1950) (the decree was never published).
In two recent consent decrees, the defendants were ordered to adopt additional marks
to distinguish their products from those of cartel associates. United States v. SKF,
supra note 2; United States v. The Permutit Co., CCH TRAn REG. REP. ff 62,888
(S.D.N.Y. 1951).
67. The government pointed this out in its trial court brief. Timberg, supra note
65, at 338-341.
68. 341 U.S. 593, 598-599 (1951).
69. Id. at 603.
70. Id. at 605-606.
as an unreasonable restraint of trade for an American industrial concern
to organize foreign subsidiaries, each limited to servicing a particular mar-
ket area." 71
The facts explicit and assumed in these statements are in clear con-
tradiction with the very facts of the case which were the thrust of the trial
judge's theory outlined above. The only plausible explanation of this
paradox is that the latter facts were immaterial in the Supreme Court's
approach to the case. Apparently the decision would have been the same
had American Timken "created" an English company and then made the
agreements as a consequence of its investment. Such talk would not be
possible had operative significance been given to the actuality, viz. that
Timken invested in the English company to continue restrictive agree-
ments of two decades standing with a competitor, that it was not attempt-
ing to enter foreign markets but was committing itself to stay out of them
in return for competitive immunity at home. In short, the concurring and
dissenting Justices were giving weight to an hypothesis. The only ade-
quate reason for their doing so is that the rule of the case would apply
equally to that hypothesis. Hence it cannot be fairly said that the Court
affirmed the trial judge's finding of a violation of the Act on the same theory
that he invoked. The branch of the case touching on the appropriate
remedy likewise supports this conclusion.
Refusal of Divestiture.-The Supreme Court's reversal of the divesti-
ture order was the crowning touch to a remarkable case. Justices Black,
Douglas and Minton, in dissent on this point, argued that the trial court's
discretion should be upheld since divestiture was "obviously the most
effective way to suppress further Sherman Act violations" by removing the
"temptation and means to engage in the prohibited conduct." 72 However,
Justice Reed, with the Chief Justice, invoked the difficulties of foreign trade
among other reasons against the remedy and pointed out that American
Timken's stock holdings and rights were "of value in the development of its
foreign business".73 Justice Frankfurter even indicated that the "force
of the reasoning against divestiture" led him to dissent from the ruling that
the Act had been violated.74 The dissent of Justice Jackson was grounded
in large part on the objection that finding a violation in the inter-corporate
activities "places too much weight on labels" 7 so that the affiliation
should be justified rather than disrupted.
This denial of divestiture is another defeat-in-victory for the antitrust
laws.76 The repeated reluctance of the courts to recognize the necessity
of this type of relief for the restoration of competitive conditions gives a
hollow ring to the achievement of proving the violations. The Timken
71. Id. at 606.
72. Id. at 600-601.
73. Id. at 604.
74. Id. at 605.
75. Id. at 607.
76. See Adams, supra note 51; Levi, The Antitrust Laws & Monopoly, 14 U. oF
Cm. L. REv. 153, 182 (1947).
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case is an outstanding example of judicial conservatism not only because
it involved reversal of trial court discretion but particularly because the
situation is of the kind that weighs most heavily in favor of thfs type of
relief. The inducement and opportunity to restrain trade that springs from
close property interests makes affiliation peculiarly apt for the divestiture
remedy, 77 particularly where it has been at the core of the offense.78 Con-
viction of affiliates of restraint of trade with restriction of relief to a mere
injunction against such conduct implies not only a strange concept of com-
petition but an unrealistic understanding of human psychology. Yet not only
did Justice Reed find error in the divestiture order but even took into
account, and directed the trial court to reconsider, the fact that Dewar's
death gave American Timken an opportunity to acquire a stronger hold
on the foreign companies. 79 How close affiliation militates against rather
than in favor of divestiture is unexplained.
Apart from the unfavorable forebodings of this aspect of the case for
future antitrust enforcement, it is another convincing illustration that the
Supreme Court did not approach the case with same theory as the trial
judge. Since, in his view, the inter-corporate relationship had been a
method in the illegal program, it was appropriate to deprive the parties of
the device. Furthermore, he might well have considered less stringent
relief impractical since the parties' well-demonstrated propensity to restrain
trade could be redirected to less formal arrangements for which the oppor-
77. Timberg, supra note 66, at 633, 648, 652. The Altninun. case is an out-
standing example. Aluminum Limited has been created by Alcoa by the transfer
to it of the properties of twenty-nine corporations in return for all its common
stock which was ratably distributed to the shareholders of Alcoa. The result was
identity of common stock ownership of the two corporations. The government
charged conspiracy between Alcoa and Limited on the basis of the close personal and
commercial relations, common stock ownership and failure to compete. The trial
court rejected the argument. United States v. Aluminum Corp. of America, 44 F.
Supp. 97, 253-277 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) and the special appeal court did not mention it
in its opinion, see note 58 supra. However, in the proceeding to determine relief,
the court ordered the shareholders of Alcoa to dispose of their shares in either Alcoa
or Limited with an exemption for any "Alcoa shareholder . . . who may possess
only a limited quantity of shares . . ." United States v. Aluminum Corp. of
America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). Judge Knox: was clear that the
District Court had held there was "no improper relationship between the two cor-
porations" and had been affirmed on this point by the special appellate court. Id.
at 392. But he decided that Limited had a new significance as a competitor in the
American market and that full realization of its potentiality in contributing to
effective competition in the industry required that its relations with Alcoa by way
of stock ownership be dissolved. He viewed the common ownership of a majority
of shares in both companies by eleven stockholders as an obstacle to "competition
between Alcoa and Limited . . . as keen and comprehensive as the Sherman Act
demands." Id. at 398.
78. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944) ; see generally
Note, Stcadards Governing Relief Under Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 97 U. oF
PA. L. REV. 234 (1948). But cf. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., CCH
TADE CASES 62,672 (M.D. Tenn. 1950) (construction of new theatre by subsidiary
of Crescent did not violate prohibition of acquisition of new theatres by Crescent,
injunction refused); United States v. Griffith, CCH TPA.E CASES 62,722 (W.D.
Okla. 1950) (injunction against linking open and closed towns sufficient, divestiture
refused).
79. 341 U.S. 593, 605 (1951).
tunity was provided in their close association."0 The majority of the
Supreme Court who ruled he had abused his discretion could not have
agreed with him as to the causal connection between the offense and the
inter-corporate relationship.
Difference in Supreme Court and Trial Court Theories.-Thus the
Supreme Court's treatment of the major aspects of Timken confirms the
view that the brief but broad statement of the gist of the violation was an
accurate presentation of the extensive ground on which the Court put the
case, viz. that the Act has its impact on legally separate entities without
regard to the economic unity they represent. The force of this impact can-
not be counteracted by invoking the rule of reason since it apparently
does not justify inter-affiliate restraints if it would not have like effect on
comparable restraints among independents.8 ' It is obvious that this theory
of illegality is of far wider scope than the theory of the trial judge. The
analytic difference between the two is that the facts that were of cardinal
importance in the trial judge's view were submerged and became immaterial
in the approach of the Supreme Court. The practical significance of the
difference appears in the fact that the high Court's theory would embrace
not only the situation to which the District Court's theory applies but also
situations that are substantially different. The broader theory would apply
to agreements of affiliates whether one company had invested in the others
to supplement existing restraints, or whether it had done so without such
a history of illegal practices or even whether it had created the other
companies.
The fact that two such divergent theories were invoked in the same
case puts a caveat on the use of Timken as a precedent. A court un-
sympathetic to the broad sweep of the Supreme Court's opinion has a
possible, if not graceful, means of retreat from it in the suggestion that it
was after all only a cryptic and perhaps imprecise affirmance of the trial
court.8 2  But that escape tactic should not attract any candid and objec-
tive judge. Furthermore, the superior authority of the Supreme Court's
pronouncements and the unqualified statement of its views here should
deter such warping of the case. The high Court's views should prevail and
that view is that internal restraints of affiliates are illegal. Under this
decision, the Sherman Act demands inter-affiliate competition.
80. See Timberg, supra note 66, at 652.
81. justices Frankfurter and Jackson made the distinction the legal ground of
their dissents.
82. Precedents in antitrust law are peculiarly susceptible to flexible treatment.
The explanation lies in the fact that the complexity and variety of factual situations
in the cases gives so many grounds of difference that almost every case is distinctive.
Even what seems to be the clearest "rules" share this defect. The Socony-Vacuum
case, supra note 41, seemed to have settled unequivocally that all agreements to fix
prices are illegal per se. "It is safe to say that this is one rule of law which means
just what it says." LOEviNGER, supra note 13, at 102. Yet the Circuit Court of
Appeals in the Kiefer-Stewart case, mtpra note 26, saw its way clear to hold that
agreements to fix maximum prices were legal; the Supreme Court reversed.
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PROSPECT
The immediate significance of this decision is that an American concern
cannot immunize cartel participation by investment in the stock of the co-
conspirators even to an extent that gives the power to control them. There
is the further and distinct consequence that even without cartelization those
who export American capital for business abroad cannot seek to exploit
their investment by measures detrimental to the domestic economy. 3  As
long as the ideal of "one world" is a dim and distant dream,8 4 antitrust law
can properly insist that our traders engage in foreign commerce in a fashion
that permits its advantages to accrue to labor, export and import interests
at home.85 The requirement of inter-affiliate competition on the inter-
national level contributes to this objective.
It is more difficult to forecast the future of the doctrine in the domestic
economy. At the outset, there is at least one situation in which it would
be necessary to reconcile a clash of this doctrine with statutory provisions.
The anti-merger section of the Clayton Act contained a provision which
was preserved in the Celler Act 86 amendment that that section should not
prevent corporations from forming and holding stock in "subsidiary cor-
porations for the actual carrying on of their immediate lawful business."
Technically this means no more than that the specific merger provisions of
the statute do not apply to the creation of an affiliate,8 7 but there is an im-
plication that internal restrictions in the joint conduct of the affiliate and
parent company are not illegal. This could be construed as a statutory
precedent that is inconsistent with the Sherman Act doctrine that affiliates
must compete with each other. If, however, either must give way the
Sherman Act interpretation should prevail; that Act is a statement of
overriding policy that should be suspended or replaced only by explicit
and specific statutory direction.8 8
The practical inquiry also arises as to what extent of independence
affiliates must maintain to comply with the doctrine. Except for the link
of share investment, complete structural and functional independence would
83. Note, The Supreme Court, 1950 Term, 65 H~Av. L. REv. 107, 124 (1951)
states that the decision is detrimental to current Point IV policy since it will dis-
courage investment abroad by American industry. This would seem properly a legis-
lative rather than a judicial concern. With reference to foreign policy considerations
relevant to the preservation of competition in international trade, see Note, Webb-
Pomerene v. Foreign Economic Policy, 99 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 1195, 1204-1212 (1951).
84. Increased attention has been focused on the cartel problem because of the
grave social and economic effects of cartels even when they do not directly affect our
economy. EDwARs, ET Ai., supra note 58.
85. See Note, 99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1195, 1213-1215 (1951).
86. 64 STAT. -, 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (1951). This section applies to both foreign
and domestic commerce.
87. In United States v. Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co., 87 F. Supp. 1010
(D.C. Haw. 1950) the government argued that the creation of an airline subsidiary
by a water carrier to travel parallel routes was a violation of the Sherman Act; the
court refused a motion for summary judgment. Subsequently a consent decree was
entered. Id., CCH TRADE CASES 62,722 (1951).
88. See United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-201 (1939).
be necessary for the kind of competition the Sherman Act requires.89 But
even the investment connections might have to be somewhat abnormal.
Since affiliates must be competitors, § 8 of the Clayton Act would forbid
them from having interlocking directorates under certain circumstances.90
Furthermore, the very fact of their financial relationship would make them
readily susceptible to a charge of conspiracy by "conscious parallel action" 91
if their activities coincided or supplemented each other to a marked degree.
The doctrine, in short, would drastically curtail the conduct heretofore
considered normal in the operation of a multi-corporate enterprise.
On the other hand, certain tactical advantages for the achievement
of antitrust objectives might theoretically arise from the requirement of
inter-affiliate competition. The Tinsken situation is suggestive in the re-
spect that the English and American companies there effected a merger. A
comparable application of that case on the domestic level would give a
"second crack" at the concentration of American industry that resulted from
the vast merger movements which the antitrust laws were so long im-
potent to prevent. 92 To the extent that undesirable mergers of the past are
•presently in multi-corporate form, this doctrine effectively put in practical
operation would largely counteract their economic effects by requiring
independent action of the corporate units. There is also a distinct rela-
tion to the problem of bigness. Most business mammoths probably operate
through several corporations 93 which under the impact of the doctrine
would be substantially decentralized. Nor could the doctrine be readily
evaded by destroying the corporate forms since the consolidation into one
corporation would be subject to the tightened merger provisions of the
Celler Act. Antitrust law failed in a frontal assault on these related
problems of mergers and bigness in the past; requirement of inter-affiliate
competition is a weapon for renewing the fight with a flank attack.
Apart from the theoretical utility of the doctrine as an indirect curative
of past failures, its value in the broad perspective of antitrust is highly
speculative. Considerable attention has recently been given to vertical
integration but, except as an aspect of the monopoly problem, less has been
directed to horizontal integration 04 which is probably a more common
phenomenon in our present economy.9 5 The basic issue can be posed.
National policy posits competition as the best regulator of business to insure
industrial progress and economic democracy; to this goal the self-serving
interest of business in the use of the corporate device must be sub-
ordinated so that maximum flexibility should be restricted where the com-
89. "There can be no genuine competition . . . between parent and subsidiary."
United States v. Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co., 87 F. Supp. 1010, 1013 (1950).
90. 38 STAT. 732 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1946).
91. See FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948) ; Interstate Circuit v.
United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
92. See note 10 supra.
93. See FTC release, supra notes 7 and 33.
94. See Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARV. L. Rv. 27 (1949).
95. See note 7 supra.
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petitive ideal requires. The question reduces then to how much restriction
of those business interests is demanded by the needs of a competitive
economy.96
The reasons a single enterprise uses several corporate forms are
usually matters of organizational advantage. Managerial and financial
flexibility are the basic stimuli.9 7 Savings and convenience income tax-wise,
division of risk, debt and earnings to correspond with diverse needs within
the enterprise, or increase of capitalization are possible features of fiscal
policies generating plural incorporation. Interests of management divided
on territorial, departmental or functional grounds, especially on the occasion
of expansion, may produce the same result.98 Perhaps, too, psychological
factors are involved, too nebulous to measure.99
The doctrine that requires legal units to compete with each other would
be a heavy counterweight to these advantages. By insisting on independent
exploitation of the economic resources gathered in one corporation, it would
in effect compel plural incorporators to compete with their own invest-
ments. The potential harshness of such a doctrine needs no detailed
demonstration. Inherent in it, however, is at least one provocative pos-
sibility of long-range advantage to antitrust goals: that it would contribute
to lessening the degree of effective concentration of business and industry.
It is apparent that the stimulus to subdivide an enterprise into several cor-
porations increases with the size of the enterprise. This consideration
together with the possible choice of the smaller enterprise to escape the
doctrine by consolidating its corporations, 100 indicates that the severest
pinch of the doctrine would be on the largest enterprises. A significant
standard of relative size for this purpose can be found in the optimum size
for business efficiency. 1' 1 Above that size it is likely that the activities at
the center of a corporate constellation are not focused on production and
distribution but on broad maneuvers for power and manipulative advan-
tages.102  The plea of harshness in such a situation loses its appeal. To
those who are sensitive to the dangers of excessive concentration in our
economy, 0 3 a doctrine is welcome that would reduce the scale of mass
operations to the functional level at which the maximum advantages of
efficiency are realized.
96. EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 136 (1949) states that between ex-
tremes in a policy against concentration is a question ". . . whether a corporation
should be allowed to divide its risks, debts and earnings by organizing wholly owned
subsidiaries.. .'
97. Id.;,Berle, supra note'8, at 343; Rahl, supra note 5, at 765.
98. THORlP Lr AT., supra note 7, at 165-166.
99. Adelman, supra note 94, at 34; THoRP ET AI-, supra note 7, at 166.
100. Under the Celler Act, the key question would be whether the consolidation
amounts to a substantial lessening of competition.
101. See FTc, RELATIW EFFciENcY OF BusINEss (TNEC Monograph 13, 1940).
102. EDWARDS, MAINTAINING CoMPETrrox 113 ef seq. (1949).
103. See Douglas, I., dissenting in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S.
495, 534 (1948).
NOTES
The doctrine, however, would be a rough tool to achieve this desider-
atum of antitrust.10 4 The combination of a demand for competition among
affiliates and a refusal of divestiture ignores the realities of human nature.
In the absence of far more extensive activity than the government is usually
disposed to undertake, the resistance of a business community long con-
ditioned to a different kind of thinking about affiliates would make enforce-
ment a major problem. Furthermore, the doctrine has not been limited
by considerations of size. Although enforcement might be guided by such
economic standards, the doctrine presently applies in terms to all affiliates.
Determination of what otherwise unattainable needs of a competitive
economy require such a broad doctrine must await further insight into the
significance of horizontal integration. The practical unwieldliness of the
doctrine as a tool in a policy against excessive concentration would be
aggravated in its use in more embracing programs. At present, the
theoretical possibilities of the Tiniken doctrine far outmeasure its prospects.
John J. Brennan
THE BUSINESS PURPOSE DOCTRINE IN CORPORATE
RECAPITALIZATION
Shareholders are today faced with the situation of having ordinary
income and excess profits taxes decrease corporate income perhaps as much
as .70 per cent.' If the net income after taxes is distributed as a dividend,
it then becomes part of the stockholder's personal income and subject to his
individual income tax which in the highest bracket would be 92 per cent.2
An extreme case then might result in the government's collecting 97.6 cents
out of every dollar earned by the corporation and distributed to the share-
holder. This heavy tax burden has been the stimulus in recent years for
taxpayer attempts to use the so-called "tax-free" reorganization provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code, § 112, as a device to drain off the corpora-
tion's earned surplus without incurring present tax liability. " The purpose
of this note is to examine one method of reorganization-"recapitaliza-
tion" 4-and to analyze the various attempts that have been made to realize
tax savings with the resultant development by the courts of the "business
purpose" doctrine to forestall improper use of the recapitalization provision.
Despite the fact that recapitalization is one of the oldest methods of
reorganization provided for in § 112 and has remained unchanged since its
104. Note, The Supreme Court, 1950 Term, 65 HARv. L. Rzv. 107, 123 (1951)
suggests "the proper action in a 'voluntary restraint' case should be in terms of
'monopoly' and not of 'restraint of trade'."
1. INT. REv. CODE §430(a) (2) (C).
2. INT. REv. CODE §§11(a), 12(b)(2).
3. INT. RFv. CODE § 112(g) (1) (E).
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introduction in 1921 4 there is still no definition of "recapitalization" in the
Code or the Regulations. The Regulations, however, do give the follow-
ing examples:
"A 'recapitalization', and therefore a reorganization, takes place
if, for example-
(1) A corporation with $200,000 par value of bonds outstanding,
instead of paying them off in cash, discharges them by issuing
preferred shares to the bondholders;
(2) There is surrendered to a corporation for cancellation 25 per cent
of its preferred stock in exchange for no par value common stock;
(3) A corporation issues preferred stock, previously authorized but
unissued, for outstanding common stock; or
(4) An exchange is made of a corporation's outstanding preferred
stock, having certain priorities with reference to the amount and
time of payment of dividends and the distribution of the corporate
assets upon liquidation, for a new issue of such corporation's
common stock having no such rights." '
These examples are merely illustrative and not all-inclusive since they omit
court-approved recapitalizations which replace common stock with bonds,6
preferred stock with bonds,7 or bonds with bonds of different terms.8 The
courts, following the established pattern of speaking about recapitalizations
in the most general terms,9 specifically refuse to define the generic term 10
and refer to it as being a "reshuffling of a capital structure, within the
framework of an existing corporation." 11 The reason for this lack of a
categorical definition 12 is that each case must be judged on its own merits
to prevent any opportunity for tax avoidance by a literal compliance with
the law.13
4. Revenue Act of 1921, § 202(c) (2), 42 STAT. 230 (1921). Only one other sub-
division has remained unchanged since its adoption into the Code. It is "a mere
change in identity, form, or place of organization, however effected." INT. REV. CODE
§ 112(g) (1) (F).
5. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.112(g)-2 (1943).
6. Edgar M. Docherty, 47 B.T.A. 462 (1942) But see Bazley v. Commissioner,
331 U.S. 737 (1947) wherein a bond for common stock recapitalization was not held
to be tax-free.
7. Annis Furs, 2 T.C. 1096 (1943) ; Clarence J. Schoo, 47 B.T.A. 459 (1942).
8. Commissioner v. Neustadt's Trust, 131 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1942) ; Commissioner
v. F. Edmonds' Estate, 165 F.2d 715 (3d Cir. 1948).
9. The Bureau of Internal Revenue states that a recapitalization "signifies an ar-
rangement whereby the stocks and bonds of the corporation are readjusted as to
amount, income, or priority. . . ." S.M. 3710, IV-1 Cum. BULL. 4, 5 (1925).
10. Bazley v. Commissioner, supra at 741.
11. Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 202 (1942).
12. In order to qualify as a reorganization there must be a plan of reorganization
and an exchange solely between parties to the plan of their respective stock or
securities. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.112(g)-i (1943). See note 15 infra.
13. HOLZMAN, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS 172 (1948).
The taxability of exchanges of corporate stock or securities hinges on
the interrelation of various sections of the Code. Section 112(a) sets forth
the general rule that upon sale or exchange of property the entire amount
of the gain or loss shall be recognized.14  However, an exception to the
general rule is found in § 112(b) (3) which allows non-recognition of gain
or loss if the exchange is between parties to a reorganization and pursuant
to a definite plan.15 What constitutes a reorganization is indicated in
§ 112(g) (1) which includes as its fifth example "recapitalization." 16 Since
§ 112(b) (3) states that there shall be no recognition of gain or loss when
a recapitalization occurs, the exchanges therein involved are generally called
"tax-free" transfers. However, when the stock or securities acquired in
the exchange are eventually sold, then a tax is imposed on the gain resulting
from the sale.
For example, if the X corporation, having a net worth of $2,000,000
composed of ten thousand shares of common stock with par of $100 and
an earned surplus of $1,000,000, validly reorganizes by having its sole
shareholder exchange the outstanding common for twenty thousand shares
of new common with par of $100, a distribution is effected of the $1,000,000
of earnings. Under § 112(b) (3) there is no tax payable.at the time of the
reorganization; but if the twenty thousand new shares are later sold for
$2,000,000 the shareholder must pay a capital gains tax on the $1,000,000
profit since his basis in the new shares is that which he had in the old.
Thus, in fact, the original exchange was not "tax-free" but "tax-postponed."
However, tax savings are still possible since the taxpayer may be able
to incur the tax when rates are low or when he has off-setting capital losses
by a careful selection of the year of sale. Further, he has avoided the
ordinary income tax which would have been payable had he effected the
distribution by means of a dividend. 7 Thus the tax postponement feature
of the Code although not intended to make transactions "tax-free" may be
used to decrease tax liability.
LEGISLATIE HISTORY OF THE REORGANIZATION SECTION OF THE CODE
Prompted by the demands of stockholders, creditors, or the federal and
state governments, almost every corporation at one time or another finds
14. "Section 112. Recognition of Gain or Loss. (a) General Rule-Upon the
sale or exchange of property the entire amount of gain or loss, determined under
section 111, shall be recognized, except as hereinafter provided in this section." INT.
Rxv. CODE § 112(a).
15. "Section 112. Recognition of Gain or Loss ... (b) Exchanges Solely in
Kind . . . (3) Stock for stock on reorganization.No gain or loss shall be recog-
nized if stock or securities in a corporation a party to a reorganization are, in pur-
suance of a plan of reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or securities in such
corporation or in another corporation a party to the reorganization." INT. REV.
CODE § 112(b) (3). The plan does not require a formal written document but there
must be evidence that it clearly existed. William H. Redfield, 34 B.T.A. 967 (1936)
Hortense A. Menefee, 46 B.T.A. 865 (1942).
16. "Section 112. Recognition of Gain or Loss .... (g) Definition of Reor-
ganization.-As used in this section . . . (1) The term 'reorganization' means
(E) a recapitalization. . . ." INT. REv. CODE § 112(g) (1) (E).
17. This, of course, assumes that this transaction is not a "bail out." See Text
at note 103.
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it desirable or necessary to recapitalize to achieve at least one of the follow-
ing results: to refinance at lower interest rates, to better the stipulated
conditions of a mortgage, to acquire specific assets which can only be gotten
by giving the vendor an ownership interest, to decrease income or franchise
taxes, to eliminate dividend arrearages, to comply with the anti-trust laws,
the Securities Exchange Act, or the Federal Communications Act, to form
or liquidate subsidiaries, to create or eliminate minority interests, or to
increase or reduce the capital investment.' 8 The early tax statutes 19
ignored this need for flexibility. Thus, when reorganizations involving
exchanges of corporate property and securities occurred under those acts,
it was held that the mere changes in form provided the occasion for tax-
ability. 0 However, even before these cases were finally decided, pressure
from the business world forced a change in the law, and the Revenue Act
of 1918 contained this section:
".. . when in connection with the reorganization, merger, or con-
solidation of a corporation a person receives in place of stock or securi-
ties owned by him new stock or securities of no greater aggregate par
or face value, no gain or loss shall be deemed to occur from the
exchange .... " 21
The desire of Congress not to tax "paper" alterations of corporate
structures unless it had the effect of an actual, cash-in-hand dividend or its
equivalent was sound. There are numerous legitimate reasons for re-
organization, which generally gives the shareholder nothing more than he
had before the transaction but merely changes the form of his holding. To
subject such a change to taxation would discourage necessary alterations
and would have the effect of preventing maximum corporate efficiency.
Moreover, since the federal government receives a major share of cor-
porate profits under our present tax laws, anything which injures the cor-
poration is also to some extent inimical to the public interest.22
The first attempt to postpone the taxing of reorganizations was not
markedly successful in that it did not define "reorganizations." 23 It placed
18. HOLZMAN, CoRPoRATE REORGANIZATIONS, Preface (1948).
19. Revenue Act of 1913, 38 STAT. 114 et seq. (1913) ; Revenue Act of 1916,
39 STAT. 756 et seq. (1916) ; Revenue Act of 1917, 40 STAT. 300 et seq. (1917).
20. United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921) (new company organized
under laws of a different state held essentially different from old corporation from
which it received its assets) ; Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176 (1921)
(a subdivision of assets into two corporations held taxable because the stockholders
became the owners of two distinct business ventures) ; Cullian v. Walker, 262 U.S.
134 (1923) (a holding company held essentially different from an operating com-
pany).
21. Revenue Act of 1918, § 202(b), 40 STAT. 1060 (1919). The accompanying
Report of the Senate Finance Committee succintly stated the reason for the birth
of this section: "A provision was inserted designed to establish the rule for determin-
ing taxable gains in the case of exchanges of property and to negative the assertion
of tax in the case of certain purely paper transactions." SEN. REP. No. 617, 65th
Cong., 3d Sess. 5-6 (1918); 1939-1 CuM. Buu. 120 (Part 2).
22. HoLzmAx, CoRPoRATE REORGANIZATIONS 68 (1948).
23. Id. at 48.
the emphasis upon the par value of stock rather than on the fair market
value,24 and it did not give the non-recognition benefit to the corporation
but instead limited it to the individual shareholder.25 These defects were
corrected in the Revenue Acts of 1921 26 and 1924.27 At the time the
Code was extended to include "recapitalization" as one means of "re-
organization", 28 the legislative purpose was reiterated:
"Congress has heretofore adopted the policy of exempting from
tax the gain from exchanges made in connection with a reorganization
in order that ordinary business transactions will not be prevented on
account of the provisions of the tax law." 29
With these modifications the reorganization provisions remained sub-
stantially unchanged until 1934 when an attempt was made to repeal them
on the grounds that they permitted vast tax evasion. This effort was de-
feated since business was in the throes of a depression and most reorganiza-
tions were valid readjustments of capital structure. Elimination of the
provisions at that time would have allowed many taxpayers to recognize
and deduct heavy losses then being suffered. In addition, Congress still
found it desirable to exempt from immediate taxation those changes in a
corporation which strengthened its financial position and did not result in
a shareholder's receiving the equivalent of a cash dividend.30 The only
major attempt at repeal thus beaten down,3 1 the section has continued, with
minor additions and modifications, to the present day.
24. Id. at 50.
25. Gregg Statement, N.Y. Tiimes, January 5, 1924, p. 1, col. 2; SEMMAN,
LEGIsLAT= HISTORY oF FEDERAL INcOME TAX LA-ws 1938-1861 690 (1938).
26. §202(c) (2), 42 STAT. 230 (1921).
27. §203(b) (3), 43 STAT. 256 (1924); §203(h), 43 STAT. 257 (1924).
28. See note 4 supra.
29. H.R. RP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1924) ; Gregg Statement, supra;
SEIDMAN, op. cit. supra note 25 at 690.
30. "The policy was adopted of permitting reorganizations to take a wide variety
of forms, without income-tax liability. As a result, astute lawyers frequently at-
tempted . . . to take advantage of these provisions by arranging in the technical
form of a reorganization, within the statutory definition, what were really sales ..
The courts have shown a commendable tendency to look through the mere form of
the transaction into its substance. The Supreme Court has indicated that the broad
principle underlying these sections is that no taxable profit is realized from a re-
organization, if no money passes and if the changes in corporate organization are
essentially changes only in form, with the stockholders continuing their former in-
terest in the original enterprise. [The committee then recommended certain changes
in the law and concluded]. . . . By these limitations the committee believes that it
has removed the danger that taxable sales can be cast into the form of a reorganiza-
tion, while at the same time, legitimate reorganization, required in order to strengthen
the financial condition of the corporation, will be permitted." H.R. REP. No. 704,
73d Cong. 2d Sess. 13 (1934); SEIDMAN, op. cit., supra note 31 at 338; 1939-1
Cum. BuLL. 564 (Part 2). See also 78 CONG. REc. 2512 (1934) wherein letter from
Secretary of Treasury to the House Ways and Means Committee is reported in which
the Treasury advocates non-recognition of taxable gain "where the stockholders in
the enterprise are retaining their interest without the receipt of cash and the essential
continuity of the business is being preserved."
31. Another attempt was an amendment introduced in 1935 by Representative
Marcantonio but this was also defetaed. 79 CONG. R c. 12426 (1935).
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BUSINESS OR CORPORATE PURPOSE, DOCTRINE
Origin of the Doctrine-That Congress intended something more than
mere literal compliance with the wording of the reorganization provisions
in order to receive the benefits of tax postponement was first judicially
declared in 1935 in Gregory v. Helvering.32 There the taxpayer owned
all the stock of United Mortgage, whose assets included a block of Monitor
stock which it was profitable to sell. To have United sell it would have
resulted in taxable income to the corporation followed by a personal income
tax on the taxpayer when the remaining gain was distributed as a dividend.
Alternatively, if United had distributed the stock as a dividend in kind it
would have been taxed as ordinary income to the taxpayer. To avoid such
heavy taxation a new corporation, Averill, was organized, and a "tax-free"
reorganization was effected by having United transfer the Monitor stock
to Averill in consideration of its entire stock issue.33 The Averill stock
was then distributed to the taxpayer as shareholder. 34 Three days later
Averill was liquidated and'its sole asset-Monitor stock-was distributed
as a liquidating dividend to the taxpayer, who immediately sold it. The
taxpayer then reported the difference between the market value of Monitor
and the adjusted basis of Averill as a long term capital gain 3 5 and the
Board of Tax Appeals sustained her position on the ground that she had
technically complied with the statute.36 The Second Circuit reversed and
taxed the distribution of Averill stock as an ordinary dividend by dis-
qualifying the reorganization with this statement:
". .. the underlying presupposition is plain that the readjustment
shall be undertaken for reasons germane to the conduct of the venture
in hand, not as ephemeral incident, egregious to its prosecution. To
dodge the shareholder's taxes is not one of the transactions contem-
plated as corporate 'reorganizations.' "3
32. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
33. "Section 112. Recognition of Gain or Loss . . . (i) Definition of reor-
ganization . . . (1) The term 'reorganization' means . . . (B) a transfer by a
corporation of all or a part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after
the transfer the transferor, or its stockholders or both are in control of the corpora-
tion to which the assets are transferred ... " Revenue Act of 1928,
§112(i) (1) (B), 45 STAT. 818 (1928).
34. "Section 112. Recognition of Gain or Loss . . . (g) Distribution of stock
on reorganization.-If there is distributed, in pursuance of a plan of reorganization,
to a shareholder in a corporation a party to the reorganization, stock or securities
in such corporation or in another corporation a party to the reorganizations, with-
out the surrender by such shareholder of stock or securities in such a corporation, no
gain to the distributee from the receipt of such stock or securities shall be recog-
nized." Revenue Act of 1928, § 112(g), 45 STAT. 818 (1928). This section created
a loophole employed by many taxpayers to "spin off" certain specific assets at capital
gain rates. This loophole was eliminated in 1934. See H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934) ; U.S. Treas. Reg. 86, §29.112(g)-5 (1934). It was rein-
stated in 1951. INT. REV. CODE § 112(b) (11).
35. Revenue Act of 1928, § 115(c), 45 STAT. 822 (1928).
36. Evelyn F. Gregory, 27 B.T.A. 223 (1932).
37. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 811 (2d Cir. 1934).
The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the transaction was "simply an
operation having no business or corporate purpose. . . ." 38
The narrow holding of the Gregory case was that tax postponement
would be refused where the new corporation was created and then liquidated
without doing any business, and at first the courts tended to restrict its
effect to such sham transactions.39 Thus, upon reexamining the Gregory
doctrine the Second Circuit concluded:
".. the incorporators adopted the usual form for creating busi-
ness corporations; but their intent, or purpose, was merely to draught
the papers, in fact not to create corporations as the court understood
that word. That was the purpose which defeated their exemption, not
the accompanying purpose to escape taxation; that purpose was legally
neutral. Had they really meant to conduct a business by means of the
two reorganized companies, they would have escaped whatever other
aim they might have had. . . ." 40
Today the courts still speak of Gregory as depriving sham dealings of
tax freedom,41 but the principle of the case has been broadened, and its
application has been extended to all types of reorganizations, whether sham
or bona fide, particularly recapitalizations. 42 This expansion beyond mere
sham transactions has been criticized on the ground that the courts are
violating the plain meaning of the statute by reading into it requirements
which Congress has not mentioned or intended.43 However, that policy has
great merit when applied to prevent tax evasion.
The judicial requirement of a "business or corporate purpose" in order
to achieve tax postponement in reorganization situations raised the question
whether that purpose had to be limited to things which benefited the cor-
poration or whether a shareholder's business purpose would be sufficient.
While it is true that whatever helps the corporation also aids the share-
holder, the reverse is not necessarily so. This distinction was best illus-
38. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
39. Harold B. Franklin, 34 B.T.A. 927 (1936) ; Electrical Securities Corporation.
34 B.T.A. 988 (1936) aff'd 92 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1937); Bremer v. White, 10 F.
Supp. 9 (D.C. Mass. 1935); Lea v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1938).
40. Chisholm v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1935).
41. Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 753, 757 (8th Cir. 1947); Estate of
Lewis B. Mayer, 15 T.C. 850, 875 (1950).
42. The business purpose test has even been extended into fields other than re-
organizations. Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir.
1944) (personal holding company matter); Morsman v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 18
(8th Cir. 1937) (trust matter) ; Hubbell v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 516 (6th Cir.
1945) (employee bonus plans); Allen v. Trust Company of Georgia, 149 F.2d 120
(5th Cir. 1945) (gift tax). See HOLZMAN, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS 310 (1948)
and Keller, Far Reaching hnfluenwe of the Gregory Case, MASTER OF BusiNEss AD-
mINISTRATION THESIS, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA (1946).
43. Ballatine, The Courts and Tax Administration: A Plea for a Return to the
Statutory Language, 35 A.B.A.J. 369 (1949); Hendricks, Development in Taxation
of Reorganization, 34 CoL. L. REV. 1198 (1934) ; BAAR AND MORRIS, HIDDEN TAXES
IN CORPORATE REORGANIZATION §§ 3 and 4 (1935).
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trated when a corporation with only common stock outstanding recapitalized
by replacing half of its common with 6 per cent debentures. The alleged
corporate purpose was to achieve corporate tax-saving through deduction
of the newly created "interest" charge as a business expense. However,
assuming that the company profited and paid taxes at the rate of 52 per
cent, the fixed charge which was then saddled on the corporation was al-
most double the tax saving and the corporation had not had the advantage
of any added working capital.44  Thus there was no real corporate business
purpose. However, there was an advantage to the shareholder since he
was now in a preferred position during liquidation and so long as he re-
tained the bonds he would receive a larger monetary distribution from the
corporation.
In the beginning this distinction was unnoticed by the courts but in
1943 it was specifically announced for the first time with the statement
that it was one of long standing. 45 The courts then entered an era of
emphasizing this difference in situations similar to the ones in which it was
originally ignored.46 This phase was ended when taxpayers tried to rely
on the lack of a corporate business purpose as grounds for denying that
variations in their companies' financial structures were reorganizations
within the meaning of § 112(b) (3), such a ruling being sought in order to
achieve various technical tax advantages. 47 It was then judicially con-
cluded that segregation of business purposes into two types was impractical
44. Adam A. Adams, 5 T.C. 351 (1945).
45. "It has been said frequently that arrangement to suit the personal convenience
of stockholders cannot be held to relate to the business purposes of a corporation,
where no business purpose to the corporation is served." The Humko Company, 12
P-H 1943 T.C. MEm. DEc. 43511 (1943).
46. The pre-1943 cases did not discuss any possible distinction of business pur-
poses in situations where the function of the reorganization was to allow the share-
holder the choice between maintaining his interest in a holding company or owning
the operating Company outright, Chester A. Souther, 39 B.T.A. 197 (1939) ; or where
bonds replaced common stock in order to reduce income taxes and to discuss the
market value of the stock, Edgar M. Docherty, 47 B.T.A. 462 (1942) ; or where pre-
ferred replaced one half of the common so that a shareholder's estate could pay the
estate taxes by selling the preferred rather than the common, thus maintaining voting
control, Jacob Fischer, 46 B.T.A. 999 (1942). After 1943 the court placed great
emphasis on whose business purpose was involved in reaching a decision in situa-
tions similar to the above. Bazley v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 237 (3d Cir. 1946)
aff'g 4 T.C. 897 (1945); Heady v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1947);
Louis Wellhouse, Jr., 3 T.C. 363 (1944).
47. Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947) to step up basis
of depreciation and avoid INT. Ray. CODE § 113(a) (7) (B). Standard Realization
Company, 10 T.C. 708 (1948) (same); Survaunt v. Commissioner, supra (to have
a loss recognized) ; Walter S. Heller, 2 T.C. 371 (1943) (same) ; Lewis v. Commis-
sioner, 176 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1949) (to reduce the tax on the cash distributed from
ordinary income tax to one on capital gains). Any cash distributed in a reorganization
is taxable as ordinary income up to the amount of gain realized on the reorganization
if that amount is less than the undistributed profits accumulated after February 28,
1913. INT. Ray. CoDE § 112(c) (2). If there is a liquidation of a corporation then the
gain is a capital one and taxed accordingly. INT. Rav. CODE §§ 115(c) and 117(a) ;
Estate of Elsie W. Hill, 10 T.C. 1090 (1948) (same) ; Love v. Commissioner, 113
F.2d 236 (3d Cir. 1940) (same).
and artificial,48 this being the view urged by the text writers.49 The
Regulations, however, adhere to the distinction.50 "
The insistence that there is no dichotomy of purposes has not experi-
enced a smooth life. In eliminating the distinction, the tax courtP1 relied
on the Supreme Court opinion in Bazley v. Commissioner.52  In that
case the taxpayers owned all but one share of the common stock of a com-
pany which was recapitalized by issuing debentures and no par common
for the old common and surplus. The taxpayers alleged that such a move
was desirable because (1) the company was entering a new and risky field
and the bonds would better enable a recovery of their investment in case
of liquidation, (2) in the event of death, the bonds could be sold to pay
estate taxes without weakening or loss of control, (3) the indebtedness
would permit a tax saving and (4) the reduction in book value of the
stock would enable key employees to buy into the business. The Third
Circuit denied that the last two reasons actually existed and described the
first two as shareholders' business purposes and not corporate ones.53 Con-
sequently, the validity of the "reorganization" was denied and the bonds
were taxed as ordinary income from distribution of the surplus under
§ 115(g).5 4 Had the recapitalization been upheld, the sale or retirement
of the securities would have been taxed as capital gain.5 5 The Supreme
Court affirmed,"0 but for what reasons is not too clear.
The Bazley case has been frequently criticized. Some writers view
the case with alarm since they feel that the Supreme Court relied upon the
lower court's reasoning that § 115(g) controlled the case. It is felt 5 7 that
to apply § 115(g) to § 112 is contrary to the legislative history of the re-
spective sections. Further, it is urged that Bazley involved an actual
exchange of stock for bonds and thus comes within § 112 and that the
court ignored this and erroneously considered the facts as a cancellation or
redemption of stock in order to fall within § 115(g).5s
48. Survaunt v. Commissioner, supra note 47, at 757; Lewis v. Commissioner,
supra note 47, at 650.
49. Spear, "Corporate Business Purpose" In Reorganization, 3 TAX L. RMV.
225 (1947) ; Note, 43 ILL. L. REv. 512 (1948). But see Bittker, What Is a "Bus ess
Purpose" in Reorganizations? 8 N.Y.U. INSTrruTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 134
(1950).
50. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.112(g)- and 2 (1943).
51. Estate of John B. Lewis, 10 T.C. 1080, 1088 (1948).
52. 331 U.S. 737 (1947).
53. Bazley v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 1946).
54. Ibid.
"Section 115. Distributions by Corporations . . . (g) Redemption of Stock.
-(1) In general.-If a corporation cancels or redeems its stock (whether or not
such stock was issued as a stock dividend) at such time and ir such manner as to
make the distribution and cancellation or redemption in whole or in part es-
sentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend, the amount so dis-
tributed in redemption or cancellation of the stock, to the extent that it repre-
sents a distribution of earnings or profits accumulated after February 28, 1913,
shall be treated as a taxable dividend." INT. REv. CODE § 115(g) (1).
55. INT. REv. CoDE §§ 117(a) and (f).
56. See note 52 supra.
57. Gutkin and Beck, Stock Redemption As Taxable Events Under Section
115(g), 24 TAxES 1172, 1180 (1946).
58. Gutkin, Recapitalizing an Existing Business, 5 N.Y.U. INsTITuTE oN FEDERA.
TAXATION 795 (1947).
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A more popular interpretation has been crystallized in the "effect"
doctrine. This test is based on the fact that the Supreme Court did not
stress the business purpose doctrine as the lower court did, but rather
criticized that opinion for its "choice of phrasing." 59 Furthermore,, the
court said that the purpose of the reorganization provisions was not "to
exempt from payment of a tax, what as a practical matter is realized
gain." (0 It then emphasized the fact that the debentures had the effect of
being a cash dividend since the corporation had a surplus of $855,000 and
the bonds were distributed pro rata and callable at the will of the corpora-
tion which in this case was the will of the taxpayer.6 ' Thus others conclude
that the case did not extend § 115(g) but rather "dealt a polite but fatal
blow to the business purpose rule and substituted for it a more realistic
test"-the "effect" test. 2  The First Circuit has echoed this analysis by
hinting that Bazley not only destroys any dichotomy of purposes but also
the utility of the business purpose doctrine as a test in reorganizations. 63
The fact that a court has supported such a test is unfortunate since busi-
ness purpose should be, and probably still is, the important criterion in
reorganizations.
6 4
The tax court still considers business purpose to be a controlling fac-
tor, on the basis that if the distribution tends to have the effect of a dividend
then this is to be viewed as evidence that there is no business purpose
present rather than as the occasion for absolutely denying the non-
recognition features of § 112.6r It is submitted that the tax court has the
wisest solution and that Bazley actually affirms this. Section 115(g) is
59. Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737, 743 (1947).
60. Id. at 740.
61. In the companion case, Adams v. Commissioner, suzpra the securities were
not callable but rather were 20 year bonds. Nevertheless, a tax was imposed. Thus,
it seems taxability is not dependent on callability despite its emphasis in the Bazleyv
case.
62. Barker, Why Not Be Practical About Recapitalizations? 8 N.Y.U. INsTI-
TUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 227, 228 (1950).
63. Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646, 650 (1st Cir. 1949). But see Com-
missioner v. Snite, 177 F.2d 819, 822-823 (7th Cir. 1949) wherein the court mini-
mizes the effect test as applied to section 115(g). "Respondent [Commissioner]
insists it is now established law that the net effect of the transaction, rather than the
motives and purposes of the corporation or its stockholders, is the test of taxability.
It must be recognized that the net effect rationale inheres in a number of decisions.
[Citing Bazley and others]. But all this means is that no one factor is controlling.
It surely does not mean that the mere existence of sufficient earnings and profits to
cover the acquisition of the stock automatically brings the transaction within the pro-
visions of Section 115(g). . . . Just as the presence of a legitimate business pur-
pose will not, standing alone, conclusively determine that Section 115 (g) is inapplicable,
so the mere fact that the corporation has sufficient surplus available does not con-
clusively determine that the section is applicable. All relevant factors must be con-
sidered in determining the net effect of the transaction."
64. Consequently the problem of what constitutes the standards of the effect
test and whether these factors are the same for Section 112(b) (3) as they are for
Section 115(g) will not be discussed. See Kaufman, How To Treat Stock Redemp-
tions, 9 N.Y.U. INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 1007 (1951) where it is questioned
whether these factors are the same.
65. Rufus Riddlesbarger, 16 T.C. 820 (1951) ; H. Grady Manning Trust, 15 T.C.
930 (1950); Marjorie N. Dean, 10 T.C. 19 (1948).
mentioned in Bazley not as the basis for the decision but only in connec-
tion with the way it was interpreted below. The criticism of the language
employed by the lower court seems to be directed at the use of § 115(g)
to arrive at the result that "nothing was accomplished that would not have
been accomplished by an outright debenture dividend," 66 rather than at the
separation of business purposes into two classes. The court holds that
§ 112 does not cover reorganizations which are "merely a vehicle, however
elaborate or elegant, for conveying earnings from accumulations to the
stockholders," 67 but indicates that if there were a valid reason for re-
capitalizing then no gain would be recognized.
68
What would the result have been if the debentures had been related
to the alteration of the financial structure? In Edgar M. Docherty 69 a
recapitalization, similar to the one attempted in Bazley, was allowed since
there was a valid corporate reason for the action-a desire to keep control
in the hands of those officers who had built the company and to avoid new
shareholders who might be unfriendly. Life insurance was issued on the
three officers, payable to a trust with the intention of retiring the stock of
any one who died. Since the value of the stock had increased to $600
despite regular dividends as high as 30%, the insurance was inadequate to
complete the plan successfully. The solufion was thought to lie in a re-
capitalization by which bonds would decrease the book value of the stock.
This was allowed in spite of the fact that the bonds were callable by the
corporation, but the court noted, significantly, that 96% of the bonds were
still held by the taxpayers at the time of the litigation, three years after
the plan was put into effect. This case clearly supports the inference in
Bazley that bonds for stock constitutes a recapitalization if the redemption
is a necessary modification of the capital account.
While Docherty is a pre-Bazley case the theory that bonds for stock
is capable of being a reorganization has again been expounded in H. Grady
Manning Trust,70 where a merger replaced old preferred with new pre-
ferred and bonds so that the accumulated dividends were extinguished. The
court ruled there was a valid business purpose and that Bazley was "clearly
distinguishable." 71
It thus seems evident that Bazley did not extend § 115 (g) into the
reorganization provisions and that it did not destroy the business purpose
doctrine. It is true, however, that the courts no longer speak of any
66. Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737, 743 (1947).
67. Ibid.
68. "No doubt, if the Bazley Corporation had issued the debentures to Bazley
and his wife without any recapitalization, it would have made a taxable distribution.
Instead, these debentures were issued as a part of a family arrangement, the only
additional ingredient being an unrelated modification of the capital account." (em-
phasis added) Id. at 742.
69. 47 B.T.A. 462 (1942).
70. 15 T.C. 930 (1950).
71. "There are no facts in the record from which we could make an inference
that the plan of reorganization which was carried out was conceived for the purpose
of disguising the distribution of a taxable dividend ... " H. Grady Manning Trust,
supra note 70, at 942.
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distinction of business purpose. Should such a refinement be dropped
from the law? It is unrealistic to say that there is no valid distinction
between the business purpose of a corporation and that of a shareholder.
The first reorganization provisions were passed in order to give flexibility
to the corporation and allow it to strengthen its financial structure.72 The
emphasis was on alterations which benefited the corporation. There was
no mention of a desire to aid the individual shareholder as such. There-
fore, the courts should not abandon their earlier position but rather should
define corporate business purpose in terms of such alterations in the finan-
cial structure of the corporation as tend to increase the profitability of the
business.
THE BUSINESS PURPOSE DOCTRINE AND THE EFFECT TEST COMPARED
IN SPECIFIC SITUATIONS
Bonds for Bonds-The Commissioner maintains that the capital of a
corporation is composed solely of stock and, thus, when bonds of a company
are exchanged for new bonds of the same company, it is a refinancing, not
a recapitalization, so that any realized gain is taxable.78 This position has
been repudiated by the courts, who hold recapitalization has a broader
meaning and includes the exchange of securities. 74 The courts have the
preferable view since long term indebtedness is really the use of "per-
manent" capital in the established method of "trading on the equity" of the
corporation. The replacing of bonds with new ones having different terms
as to maturity, security or interest has not given the bondholders anything
more or less than they previously had-as far as taxable income is con-
cerned-yet it has enabled the corporation to better its financial position.
A corporate business purpose exists and the transaction does not have the
effect of a dividend. Nevertheless, the Commissioner still adheres to his
view.
7 5
Bonds for Preferred Stock-In Annis Furs76 a recapitalization was
recognized when cumulative preferred was exchanged for debentures in
order to reduce a 62 per cent dividend rate to 6 per cent interest expense.
The Tax Court felt that the reduction of one half of one per cent in the
fixed charge was a sufficient business purpose in view of a $137,000 deficit.
However, there is a significant difference between a dividend arrearage
and outstanding creditors' claims with respect to obtaining future credit for
the company and operating without interference from outsiders. It there-
fore seems that there was not a real corporate business purpose in re-
72. 1939-1 Cum. Bum. 564 (Part 2).
73. I.T. 2035, III Cum. BuLL. 55 (1924).
74. Commissioner v. Neustadt's Trust, 131 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1942), Commis-
sioner v. Edmond's Estate, 165 F.2d 715 (3d Cir. 1948).
75. The Commissioner recently argued that the cases in note 74 supra were
incorrect. He lost. Mutual Fire and Marine, 12 T.C. 1057 (1949). Commissioner
does not acquiesce. 1949-2 Cum. BULL. 4.
76. 2 T.C. 1096 (1943).
capitalizing. The reason for the shareholders' approval of this move by
which they lost a half per cent income can only be inferred from the facts
of the case. The shareholders were resident Canadians and sale of their
stock would not be subject to United States tax on the gain realized 7 7 but,
since the preferred had voting rights, would have meant a weakening of
control which would not occur in a sale of bonds. Although there is
nothing in the court's opinion which would indicate that this was why
the reorganization was affected it is not assuming too much to say that
the shareholders contemplated such a plan since the conversion of a cumula-
tive dividend into creditors' claims for a saving of less than eight per cent
of the total charge is hardly indicative of sound corporate finance.
In this case the current tax court approach would reach a contrary
result and recognize any gain on exchange since the distribution of the
bonds had the effect of being a taxable dividend because of the newly
acquired ability to sell without altering control. This effect indicates a
lack of business purpose and on reexamination of the facts no sound cor-
porate purpose is found. Were the tax court to permit shareholder pur-
poses, then it would result in no gain being recognized since there are some
here in the form of preference to assets and stability of income. The
"effect" test, of course, would impose a tax.
In Clarence . Schoo 7s a recapitalization had 7 per cent debentures
replace 7 per cent preferred. The objective was to create a tax saving
through an interest expense deduction. The Board of Tax Appeals sus-
tained the legitimacy of the transaction without noting whether the pre-
ferred was cumulative or had voting rights. Presumably the preferred was
non-voting and probably non-cumulative since the bonds were labeled
"income debentures" and true income bonds bear interest only where earn-
ings so allow.79 Since it would have been possible for the shareholder to
sell his preferred without affecting voting control and thus to realize a
capital gain, the issuance of the bonds did not add to his powers in that
respect or have the effect of a taxable dividend. Further, since the bonds
are income debentures, the corporation is not burdened with a fixed charge
but is in the same position as before except that it now has a deductible
interest item which the dividends did not provide.80  Here is an adequate
corporate purpose. Both the tax court criteria and the effect test are met.
Bonds for Common Stock-When the object of the recapitalization is
to facilitate the sale of the company it should not be "tax-free" because
this is a shareholder's purpose. In Heady v. Commissioner,8 ' decedent's
77. INT. RFv. CODE- § 211(a).
78. 47 B.T.A. 459 (1942).
79. "Income Bonds-Bonds on which interest is payable only when earned and
after payment of interest upon prior mortgages." BLAcK's LAW DICtioNARY (4th
Ed. 1951).
80. Whether the court would today allow the deduction of interest on this type
of bond is doubtful. See cases cited in note 90 infra. That, however, does not affect
the question of whether this transaction is a tax free reorganization since it was at-
tempted to aid the corporation.
81. 162 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1947).
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will provided that his "one man" corporation should be sold for a fair price
at the earliest opportunity. Such a price was $245 a share but the highest
bid was only $100. The personal ability of the manager-majority share-
holder was the key to successful operation of the company and consequently
very few buyers were available. One did agree to the price but lacked
the financial means. A plan was therefore devised whereby the corpora-
tion would reorganize and issue 1,000 shares of common with par of one
dollar and $135,000 of debentures which would mature in 5-12 years. Dur-
ing this time the prospective buyer would run the company and buy the
stock from his salary. The debentures were greater than the surplus and
had the effect of draining off the accumulated earnings as they were retired.
With the surplus being syphoned off, the price of the stock was reduced to
approximately $125 per share. Buyer's purchase of the common was tied
in to the retirement of the bonds so that he could not get control of the
company until all but $12,500 of the debt was satisfied. The court relied
on the "effect" doctrine and taxed the debentures. The court could, how-
ever, have relied on a lack of corporate purpose since the recapitalization
aided only the shareholders who could find no takers for $245 a share, but
could sell by paying themselves the surplus and reducing the price to $125
a share.
As stated previously the Docherty case 82 involved a recapitalization
of bonds for common stocks in order to preserve control in the hands of the
surviving officer-stockholders upon death of any one of them. The courts
held this was valid., At first glance this decision may appear inconsistent
with Bazley, since a similar argument was raised there. In both cases
the distribution of bonds gives the shareholder a disposable interest which
he did not have before and thus has the effect of a taxable dividend. Thus,
under the "effect" test Docherty would be overruled. However, applying
the tax court approach, it is to be observed that although the effect of the
reorganization indicates that there is no proper business purpose in either
case, there actually is one in Docherty while there is none in Bazley. In
the former, control is kept in the hands of the active participants and
builders of the company. This is beneficial to the corporation, since the
managers have made it a profit-making concern and under their guidance
it will probably continue as such in the future. In the latter, however,
the husband is the only active shareholder; and though his death might
necessitate selling the stock and the subsequent loss of control by the
Bazley family, such an event would not adversely affect the company since
its driving force would be gone anyway. The death of the wife might
present problems to the husband but not one of loss of control, since his
voting control was in any event unassailable.8 3 Here again if the tax
82. See note 69 supra.
83. Mrs. Bazley owned 20 per cent of the stock with her husband holding the
balance less one qualifying share. Thus, Mr. Bazley was assured of a 4 to 1 majority
at all times. In Docherty the three officers owned 33 per cent, 33 per cent, and 30
per cent with 4 per cent in the hands of a director not covered by insurance but
whose shares would be purchased on the death of any one of the officers. Without the
court does not distinguish between business purposes then Basley would
constitute a valid recapitalization. It is beneficial to the shareholder to
control the corporation even if it is not beneficial to the corporation to be
controlled by that shareholder, especially if unexperienced. While the
"effect" test would tax both, the tax court-corporate purpose would tax
only Bazley and the tax court-shareholder purpose would tax neither.
Since it is true that if a corporation is originally capitalized with
bonds and stocks there will be no tax problem,84 it may be thought inequi-
table to hamper honest attempts by shareholders to keep family corpora-
tions within the family by a bond-for-common recapitalization. However,
the legislative history of the reorganization provisions indicate that this
was not the concern of Congress, and thus it is necessary to preserve the
differences between a corporate and a shareholder's business purpose. To
remedy this situation Congress enacted in the Revenue Act of 1950 a new
provision to allow the corporation, without tax consequences, to buy as
treasury shares the stock of a decedent up to an amount equal to all of the
death taxes if the stock is more than 35 per cent of the net estate.8 5 This
should eliminate the difficulties of the decedent's estate in finding liquid
assets to extinguish his tax liability.
In passing it is interesting to note two facts. First, the Docherty case
presents a paradox in the tax law in that bonds may be issued "tax-free"
as a reorganization yet the same end result is taxable if the bonds were
issued as a dividend on the common stock.8 6 In light of Strassburger v.
Commissioner 8 7 permitting a non-taxable stock dividend of non-voting
preferred on common it is admitted that the results are somewhat incon-
sistent.88 Second, if the bonds are taxed as a dividend then, are the sub-
sequent interest payments by the corporation deductible expenses or addi-
tional dividends? The Commissioner allowed the deduction for interest
plan the two remaining officers only had a 2 to 1 majority (provided they could agree)
and the sole survivor could become the minority interest.
84. Assuming the debentures bear a reasonable relationship to the capital stock
invested and thus are recognized as a debt rather than a portion of proprietorship.
1432 Broadway Corporation, 4 T.C. 1158 (1945); Clyde Bacon, Inc. 4 T.C. 1107
(1945).
85. "Section 115. Distribution by Corporations .... (g) Redemption of
Stock.- . . . (3) Redemption of stock to pay death taxes. -The provisions of
this subsection shall not apply to such part of any amount so distributed with respect
to stock the value of which is included in determining the value of gross estate of
a decedent in accordance with section 811, as is distributed after such decedent's death
and within the period of limitations for the assessment of estate tax provided in sec-
tion 874(a) (determined without the application of section 875) or within 90 days
after the expiration of such period and as is not in excess of the estate, inheritance,
legacy, and succession taxes (including any interest collected as a part of such taxes)
imposed because of such decedent's death: Provided, That the value of the stock in
such corporation for estate tax purposes comprise more than 35 per centum of the
value of the gross estate of such decedent." INT. REV. CoDE: § 115(g) (3), as amended
by Revenue Act of 1951, § 320(a).
86. Doerschuck v. United States, 274 Fed. 739 (D.C., N.Y. 1921) ; United States
v. Fuller, 42 F.2d 471 (D.C. Pa. 1930).
87. 318 U.S. 604 (1943).
88. MAGI.L, TAXABLE Ixcom 58 (Rev. Ed. 1945).
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in Adams v. Commissioner,8 9 and that is the likely result as long as the
ratio of debentures to stock is reasonable and the securities meet the ap-
proved legal form of bonds-even if issued as a dividend. 90
Preferred Stock for Bonds-The replacing of bonds with preferred
stock to improve the capital structure of a company and enable it to borrow
new funds since the old debt is now a stockholder's contribution, naturally
satisfied all tests and is something that only the Commissioner would be-
lieve to be taxable.91
Preferred Stock for Common Stock-Preferred stock may be used in
recapitalization to keep control in active shareholders. Such a reorganiza-
tion was held to be within section 112 if done to meet the estate tax.92
Another reorganization was permitted to effect an issuance of all the pre-
ferred to all stockholders over 60 while the younger ones who actually did
the managing received the common. The preferred would not be fully
retired for forty years but the children of the older stockholders, who
weren't connected with the firm, could not affect the policies of the company
after they inherited the stock.93 In keeping with these decisions section
115 (g) has not been applied when a corporation purchases common from its
shareholders so that the stock may be held in the treasury and reissued to
key employees to increase their incentive by sharing in the profits. 94  By
the same token, the recapitalization should be considered tax-free if it
results in a capitalized surplus through the issuance of preferred stock in
order that the book and fair market value of the common stock will be
reduced and thus enable key employees to buy the common.95
Tax freedom was denied when preferred was substituted for common
in order to enable the taxpayer to satisfy his personal debt created by the
purchase of the common from the estate of his father. 96 The recapitaliza-
tion was taxed since only 300 shares of preferred stock were given to the
estate in final payment. How much common stock was originally pur-
89. 331 U.S. 737 (1947). See Chase, Recapitalizationls-Problems of Interest,
Deductions, Taxable Dividends and Taxable Exchanges, 1 TAx L. REv. 465, 467
(1946).
90. 1432 Broadway Corporation, supra; Dade-Commonwealth Title Company,
6 T.C. 332 (1946) ; Toledo Blade Co., 11 T.C. 1097 (1948) aff'd 180 F.2d 357 (6th
Cir. 1950).
91. Commissioner v. Capento, 140 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1944).
92. Jacob Fischer, 46 B.T.A. 999 (1942) (Mr. Fischer owned 52 per cent of the
outstanding stock and was 60 at the time of recapitalization). See previous discus-
sion of the Docherty and Bazley cases concerning bonds issued for this purpose.
93. Elmer W. Hartzell, 40 B.T.A. 492 (1939) acq. in by Commissioner 1939-2
Cum. BuL. 16. Fortified by the decisions of Adams and Bazley the Commissioner
decided to contest a similar recapitalization in which preferred was issued only to the
inactive women shareholders and their common was issued to key employees. Com-
missioner lost and the Court affirmed the decision of Hartzel. Marjorie N. Dean, 10
T.C. 19 (1948).
94. Commissioner v. Snite, 177 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1949).
95. Special Ruling, 5 CCH 1948 FED. TAx REP. 1 6059 (1947).
96. Louis Wellhouse, Jr., 3 T.C. 363 (1944).
chased is not clear, but it is presumed to be approximately 300 shares.9 7
Thus the estate's proportionate share was only 4 per cent since there were
7000 shares outstanding with all except this particular stock owned by the
taxpayer and another. To speak of losing control or being subjected to
outside interference is unrealistic so that the problem is not one of keeping
control in active hands but rather the denial of a convenient way to satisfy
a personal debt of the shareholder.
The taxing of alterations of corporate structures undertaken to enable
the taxpayer to pay personal debts has not been consistently treated. Dur-
ing the recent period of the denial of any distinction in business purposes
the courts sustained a reorganization similar to the one above except that
notes were used instead of preferred stock. The A Company transferred
all its assets to its two shareholders who assumed the liabilities. Then
the shareholders sold the assets to the newly organized B Company.9 8
They were paid in stock and notes of B. These notes were given to the
shareholders' creditors in payment of their personal debts. Under state
law the corporation could not assume its stockholders' debts so the reor-
ganization was used to side-step the local law. It was granted that this
was a shareholder's purpose but that fact was held immaterial in order that
the reorganization could be recognized. This resulted in the taxpayers' not
being able to deduct a loss or to step up the basis of the fixed assets which
must remain at the same value they were on the predecessor's books. The
courts have a commendable aim in trying to prevent fictitious losses and
artificial expenses but the existing tax laws do not sustain them. Section
112 does require a corporate business purpose and that was not present
here. The taxpayer's contention should be upheld. What is needed here
is a "wash sale" provision to cover this type of reorganization, but that is a
legislative function of Congress and not the courts.
Related Preferred Stock Transactions-Another anomaly between
stock dividends and reorganizations is presented here since if the capital
of the corporation consisted solely of common stock then a dividend of
preferred stock would be non-taxable.9 9 The recipient could then use the
preferred to satisfy his debts. True, he would pay a tax on the sale of the
stock but such tax would be at capital gain rates and not at the ordinary
income rates which apply to "unsuccessful" reorganizations.100 The Amer-
ican Law Institute would correct this. In its revision of the tax law the
97. If the estate owned the majority of the outstanding shares then the decision
is wrong. Assuming the stock was sold to provide assets to liquidate estate liabilities
then the father could have effected the reorganization before his death to meet this
emergeney. It would be valid as an aid to the company in order to keep his son
in active control. Then there is no reason why it should not be allowed now to aid
the corporation.
98. Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947) aff'g 5 T.C. 665
(1945); cf. Lyon, Inc. v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 210 (6th Cir. 1942). But cf.
Standard Realization Company, 10 T.C. 708 (1948).
99. Strassburger v. Commissioner, supra.
100. The current trend is to impose liability under section 112(c) (2) or 115(g).
Preferred Stock Dyn;amite, 34 A.B.A.J. 247 (1948).
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Institute would allow the tax-free issuance of stock dividends of preferred
and common on common 101 subject on the sale or redemption of the stock
to taxation as ordinary dividends. 02 This approach would prevent several
of the inconsistencies which exist in the law today.
If preferred stock is used to achieve a "bail out" it is generally taxed
as ordinary income. A "bail out" occurs when preferred is introduced
into the capital structure and within a relatively short time such stock is
either redeemed and usually cancelled by the corporation or is sold by the
owner to a third party who redeems it. The taxpayer hopes to limit his
tax to that on a long term capital gain. What he has actually done is to
drain off the earnings in the form of stock then convert the stock to cash.
If he had received the cash directly then it would have been taxed as a cash
dividend, but by taking two steps the taxpayer hopes to find a haven in other
provisions of the Code. If a "bail out" is attempted as a reorganization
it is fully taxable under the "effect" test, the tax court-corporate purpose
test and even the tax court-shareholders purpose test. There is a limit to
what constitutes a valid shareholder's desire and the court will not extend
it to cases of unglossed tax evasion. If the preferred is distributed as a
tax-free stock dividend and it is redeemed from the original owner then
it is treated as ordinary income under § 115(g). 103 If the owner has sold
it to a third party before its redemption then it has been held that tax on
the original owner is limited to the capital gain rate imposed on the sale.
1' 4
The third party would probably not pay a tax since the cost of the stock
and the redemption price are equal; if they are not then a capital gain tax
is imposed on the new owner too.10 5 The American Law Institute corrects
this discrepancy and treats either case as ordinary income to the original
owner.1
0 6
If the preferred was part of the original capitalization and it is then
redeemed, its taxability depends upon the reason for redemption. If idle
capital is present due to over capitalization or drop in business activity then
a redemption is a partial liquidation and a capital gain or loss.107 If no
such reason is present then § 115(g) is applied.
A stockholder who has dependents would prefer to make them in-
dependent by having a portion of his income go directly to them and thus
trade a dependency deduction for complete exemption from the high tax
rate on all income used to support such dependents. This is the aim of
recapitalizations which issue preferred to a stockholder who in turn gives
101. Stock dividends on preferred are taxable. The American Law Institute,
Federal Income Tax Statute, Tentative Draft No. 5, 171 (1951).
102. Id. at 173.
103. See note 54 sitpra.
104. Silas H. Burnham, 29 B.T.A. 605 (1933); Crown, Essentially Equivalent
to the Distribution of a Taxable Dividend, 25 TAXES 146 (1947).
105. Parker v. United States, 88 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1937). But see De Nobili
Cigar Company v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1944) where Court avoids
considering if Parker is correct.
106. American Law Institute, supra note 101, at 176. 177.
107. Ixrr. REv. CODE § 115(c).
it to a son or someone other than his wife with whom he can split his in-
come under the Code. No future dividends will go directly to that stock-
holder. Such a recapitalization would not be allowed under any test.
However, the stock dividend method has allowed this.108 The American
Law Institute would also correct this discrepancy. 109
Arriving at the Result-A problem is encountered when there is a
taxable and a non-taxable way to arrive at a given result. Must the taxable
method be used unless there is some valid business reason-over and above
a tax saving-which necessitates the use of the other method? The law
is replete with quotations stating that there is no duty on a taxpayer to
incur a tax."0 But such general dicta cannot be relied on to govern all
cases. It is true, though, that the courts have fairly consistently held that
if the end result is valid then the taxpayer may arrive there by the method
involving the least taxes."' In Commissioner v. Gilmorexm a holding
company was merged into the operating company. This was reported as
a tax-free reorganization but the Commissioner argued that since the same
result could have been accomplished by simply liquidating the holding
company which would have made the liquidating dividends taxable," 3
therefore the method used should be taxed too. The court flatly rejected
this argument and sustained the taxpayer. Whenever possible such
anomalies in the law should be eliminated. If the end result is of the type
which should be taxed then it should be immaterial to imposing taxation
how this result was reached. If it should not be taxed then the manner of
getting to the said result should be of no consequence. Taxation should
be of substance, not form.
CONCLUSION
There have been several recommendations as to application and re-
vision of § 112. It has been urged that the section be applied literally so
that no business purpose would be required with the limitation that sham
transactions would not be allowed."14 Another suggestion is that the re-
organization provisions be limited to their face unless the Commissioner
108. Strassburger v. Commissioner, supra. Taxpayer gave the stock to his wife
five days after he received it. This was prior to the Code sponsored income splitting.
Transcript of Record, p. 14.
109. American Law Institute, supra note 101 at 177.
110. "The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise
would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, can-
not be denied. [Citing several cases]." Gregory v. Helvering, supra note 32, at 469.
The Commissioner agrees with this position S.M. 4911, V-1 Ctrm. Bum. 250, 253
(1926). But see Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609 (1938) wherein it is
said at p. 613: "A given result at the end of a straight path is not made a different
result because reached by following a devious path."
111. Clara M. 'Tully Trust, 1 T.C. 611 (1943); Bass v. Commissioner, 129
F.2d 300 (1st Cir. 1942) revg 45 B.T.A. 1117 (1941).
112. 130 F.2d 791 (3d Cir. 1942).
113. INT. REV. CoDE § 115(c).
114. Ballantine, The Courts and Tax Administration: A Plea for a A Return to
the Statutory Language, 35 A.B.AJ. 369 (1949).
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can sustain the burden of proving that the principal purpose of the plan
of reorganization was tax avoidance." 5 The best approach to the problem
is a revision of the law. This is the position of the American Law In-
stitute." 6 They have integrated the stock dividend and recapitalization
section of the Code so that there is no discrepancy as to taxability between
the two. The Institute would allow all the present types of recapitalization
except the exchange of stock for debentures. This is a change of little
importance since preferred stock will accomplish everything that the issu-
ance of bonds would. There are no other pertinent reforms of the law out-
side of these, but the correlation of § 112 with § 115 is needed.
The present position of the law is what we are concerned with today,
however, and that is in a state of flux. The current treasury policy 117
is not to issue rulings to taxpayers that a proposed reorganization is non-
taxable if it involves a pro rata issuance of bonds on common when such
bonds would be taxable as a dividend if distributed as such. Reorganiza-
tions of preferred on common are non-taxable only if there are no prior
arrangements for sale of the new preferred and assurances are given that
there is no present intent to make a sale and none actually occurs within
a reasonable time. However, the closing agreement is limited to the actual
reorganization and does not bind the Treasury when the preferred is finally
disposed of. If there is a mandatory sinking fund then the sale of the
preferred voids the original closing agreement on the recapitalization and
thus the Commissioner can impose liability at the date of original issuance
or sale-whichever yields the greater tax.
This policy places more emphasis on the effect of the transaction than
the courts do. The legislative history of section 112, discussed above, em-
phasizes both a corporate business purpose and the effect of a cash in hand
dividend. Although business purpose has had a varied life the tax court
takes the position that it still is a requirement and that effect is only one of
the factors to be weighed in reaching the conclusion. If the courts limit
business purpose to factors which directly aid the corporation and in-
cidentally the shareholders, then the intent of Congress will be accomplished.
The courts' actions should give no real cause for alarm. While it is
true that recapitalizations are more adversely affected by the various tests
employed by the courts than are the other types of reorganizations even
here the bona fide recapitalizations are unaffected by any test because they
fully fall within the statute.1 8  It is only the taxpayer who is looking for
a loophole who should beware that the Commissioner with the aid of the
courts will turn it into a noose.
Frank S. Deming
115. Ballantine, supra at 372 citing Special Tax Study Committee as proponents
of this measure.
116. See American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax Statute, Tentative Draft
No. 5 (1951) and the comments therein for a detailed discussion of the revision.
117. Darrell, Recent Developenwts in. Nontaxable Reorgaizations and Stock
Dividends, 61 HA~v. L. REv. 958 (1948).
118. Bittker, What Is "Buiness Purpose" it Reorganizations? 8 N.Y.U. INsTI-
TuTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 134, 142 (1950).
